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This report of student synopses of major Soviet works on
military doctrine, strategy, and the Navy, was written by
individual students assigned to an upper level course at the Naval
Postgraduate School, NS 3450 (Soviet Military Strategy). Each
student was assigned a major historical work in these areas and
asked to prepare a short analytical report. Two of the reports at
the end are comparative reports where three or four similar or
identical Soviet works are compared and contrasted.
The reports are presented in chronological order within major
areas so as to allow the reader to view the subject are as it
changed over time. Each of these reports is available in English
and many have been translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS) of Joint Publications Research Service (JRPS) . A
number had been translated by the Soviets themselves (Progress
Publishers) or by private publishing houses.
The primary purpose of this collection is to assist students
of Soviet military thought in identifying the major works of Soviet
literature that are available to them in English. The list of
works analyzed is, naturally, not all encompassing. Students can
use this report to also summarize the contents of previous works
then attempting to assess the literature that is currently







PART I Military Doctrine and Strategy
The Offensive
(A. A. Sidorenko))
The Officer's Handbook: A
Soviet View
(S.N. Kozlov, ed.)
Scientific-Technical Progress and the
Revolution in Military Affairs
(N.A. Lomov, ed.)
The Basic Principles of Operational
Art and Tactics
(V. Ye Sakin)
The Philosophical Heritage of V.I.




Marxism-Leninism on War and Armv
(B. Byely, et al.)
The Armed Forces of the Soviet State
(A.A. Grechko)
The Initial Period of War
(S. P. Ivanov)
The Soviet Armed Forces Yesterday
(V. Ryabov)
The Command and Staff of the Soviet
Armv Air Force in the Great Patriotic
War 1941-1945
(M.N. Kozhevnikov)
The Soviet Armed Forces: A History of
Their Organizational Development
(S.A. Tyushkevich)



























Always Prepared to Defend the Fatherland
(N.V. Ogarkov)
The World Communist Movement
(V.V. Zagladin)
Progress in Military Technology and the
Armed Forces of the USSR
(M.M. Kir'yan)
Marxist -Leninist Teaching on War and
and the Army
(D.A. Volkogonov, Ed.)
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PART II Specialized Military Subjects
Military Psychology
(V.V. Shelyag, Ed.^ et al.)
Forecasting in Military Affairs A
Soviet View
(Yu. V. Chuyev and Yu. B. Mikhaylov)
Fundamentals of the Theory of Troop
Control
(P.K. Altukhov, et al.)
Civil Defense
(P.T. Yegorov, et. al)
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PART III Soviet Navv
Soviet Naval Operations in the Great
Patriotic War 1941-1945
(V.I. Achkasov and N.B. Pavlovich)
The Sea Power of the State
(S.G. Gorshkov)
The Navy: Its Role, Prospects for
Development and Employment







PART IV Comparati ve Documents
The Threat to Europe
(Progress Publishers 1981)
How to Avert the Threat to Europe
(Progress Publishers 1981)
The New Threat to Europe: Who is to
Blame?
(Novosti Press Agency Publishing House 1984)
Gary Grooms
Whence the Threat to Peace
(Collective Authors)














Reviewed by: MICHAEL CORRIGAN
The first and last sentences of this book bracket it in
establishing and reinforcing the level of military art discussed.
"Be it an engagement of podrazdeleniye, chast, 1 or soyedineniye or
a battle of operational ob" vedineniye - only the offensive leads
to the attainment of victory over the enemy." 1 "This book was
designed to facilitate the broadening of the officers' tactical
horizon." 2 The book is concerned with the operational and, mainly,
tactical level of military art. In addition, these sentences
reveal the foundation of the primacy of the offensive and the
intended audience for the work. The change in this level of
military art induced by the advent of tactical nuclear weapons is
used as an organizational locus and fundamental theme. The author
emphasizes that a change has occurred and implied is that his book
is necessary to ensure that tactical war planners do not fight the
last war. Each element of the offensive, as well as particular
tactical situations- surmounting water barriers and night actions,
1p.l "The Offensive" A. A. Sidorenko 1970 published in English
in the Soviet Military Thought Series.
2
p. 222 ibid.
p. 5 "we cannot mechanically transfer the experience of past
wars to a new situation, this can bring only harm."
1
are examined under the influence of the new technology and its
capabilities. The target of this tactical nuclear offensive is
NATO. 4
In his initial historical section the author develops trends
in warfare which he carries over into an understanding of nuclear
weapons usage and impact. The "continuous increase in scope of
the offensive" 5 ; the "increase in the maneuverability of the combat
actions" 6 ; the increase in the number of strikes aimed at creating
favorable conditions for breakthroughs 7 ; "the role of fire
increased" ; the decrease of artillery fire preparation time
coincident with the increase in artillery fire density9 ; the
dispersal of units on the attack ; all are shown as evolutionary
forces in warfare that, it is inferred, continue with the advent
of nuclear weapons. After placing nuclear weapons in the context
of the continuum of warfare's evolution, the author moves to
develop the changes in warfare and specifically in the offensive
as themes in his analysis of the impact of tactical nuclear
weapons.
4










p. 2 3 ibid.
10
p. 25 ibid.
Establishing "foreign specialist" 11 as a surrogate, Col.
Sidorenko advances the idea that the side employing a first strike
will win 12 and that preemption will ensure superiority and retention
of the initiative. 13 While developed only once in the book and only
in the space of a few pages, and while being attributed to the
West; it does not seem that these facts are indicators of small
importance. Some downplaying of this important theme seems
evident.
Nuclear weapons will act as the maneuver and mass at the axis
of attack to provide surprise and massed firepower blowing the hole
for a breakthrough. The difference between this and the
conventional search for the weak spot for breakthrough exploitation
in even the strongest enemy concentrations. 14 The author's stated
goals for the offensive are twofold: "the utter rout of the enemy
in short times and the seizure of important areas." ' Nuclear
weapons are seen to be capable of achieving the first goal. The
difference between this capability and the former situation is that
nuclear weapons accomplish this goal independently. 16 The second













as a unitary maneuver and mass instrument. The author recognizes
however that they can accomplish only the first goal of the
offensive, destruction of the enemy. The second goal must be
accomplished by other forces.
This leads to another proposition, that combined arms; armor,
airborne, aviation, especially, and nuclear strikes must be
coordinated and used together to achieve both goals of the
offensive." 17 "The primary mission of the attacking podrazdeleniye
and chast 1 will become the rapid exploitation of nuclear strikes,
completion of the smashing of surviving enemy forces, and the
seizure of specific positions, areas, and objectives." 18 The
special characteristic of armored units are shown to be
particularly well suited to nuclear warfare and exploitation of
gaps created by nuclear weapons in enemy defenses. 19 Given the
historical Soviet superiority in tanks, perhaps they should have,
in part, been regarded as a nuclear warfare asset. Airborne troops
are evaluated as being well suited to nuclear war strikes in the
enemy's rear. 20 Aviation is promoted as a method of nuclear strike
delivery and a means to destroy the enemy's nuclear capability. 21











warfare as consistent with achieving both goals of the offensive.
Backpedalling to the idea that one of aviation's missions is
to destroy the enemy's means of nuclear strike, the book actually
expands this theme to be a primary mission of all arms of the
Soviet forces. "On the whole, it should be said that combating
enemy means of nuclear attack in combined arms combat has now
become the basic content of combat actions and has become a
function of all commanders without exception." 22 The reason for
this is the acknowledgement that without timely, rapid and
persistent destruction of the enemy's nuclear capability, the
offensive could fail.
Retaining the tactical level of understanding; and given the
author's foundation that nuclear weapons have changed tactical
warfare; four principle themes have been presented. They are:
preemption, nuclear arms as maneuver and mass applications of
force, combined arms nuclear war at the tactical level, and the
new primary objective of destruction of the enemy's means to wage
nuclear war. Using these themes and an analysis of the offensive,
the author presents a very detailed how to conduct the tactical
offensive in nuclear war for the Soviet officer.
In historical context, the Soviet Union had just achieved
nuclear parity with the U.S. at the time the book was published.





Offensive" written by Col. Sidorenko shows a discrepancy in
emphasis when compared to his book. The first and last pages of
the book mention nuclear weapons and the in between is replete with
their impact on tactical warfare. The encyclopedia entry spends
10 lines out of an 8 page text on nuclear war. What seems to have
happened is that once nuclear parity had been achieved and the
Soviet leadership saw that it had the capability to attain
conventional victory over NATO it rejected the preeminent role of
nuclear weapons assigned in Colonel Sidorenko 's book. The 1983
Military Encyclopedic Dictionary entry under "The Offensive" is
almost verbatim from the 1978 Soviet Military Encyclopedia entry
except for the phrase "nuclear weapons became the principal means
of destruction in nuclear warfare." This is definitely a further
downgrading of the importance of nuclear weapons. Whether it is
also an indication that limited nuclear war is possible because
other means of destruction are paramount in nuclear war is
conjecture.
This work is a detailed handbook for the Soviet tactician,
giving him guidelines for changing conventional procedures to
accommodate the different conditions of nuclear war on the tactical
scale. For anyone attempting to understand past Soviet equipment
and personnel nuclear warfighting capabilities in a tactical
perspective, this book will be elucidating. As to actual nuclear
warfighting intentions, whether past or present, this book should
not be presented as authoritative.

THE OFFICER'S HANDBOOK: A SOVIET VIEW
by
S.N. Kozlov, Ed.
Reviewed by: PATRICK J. KOLBAS
The Officer's Handbook reached Soviet bookstores in 1971 as
the fifteenth book in the Soviet Officer's Library having a press
run of 83,000 books. Intended for all Soviet officers, but
especially for the junior officers, the book was aimed at
broadening "their outlook on military theory and solving problems
related to the training and education of their subordinates" (p.
xi) .
At times a very readable and interesting work while at
others a rather tedious and boring experience, the topics covered
by the 12 chapters range from the expected — the CPSU and the
Soviet Armed Forces, Marxist-Leninist Military Theory -- to the
not so expected — The Fundamentals of Military Psychology and
Military Pedagogy, The Essentials of Sanitation and Hygiene.
Yet, when one considers what is put forth in the American
equivalents — The Division Officer's Guide and Watchstander '
s
Guide and some of the trivial information in them — the fact is
that more emphasis is given in The Officer's Handbook to a
broader view of where the Soviet officer fits within the Soviet
system. As a result, this work is useful and important in
gaining a basic understanding of the Soviet system.
Recognizing that the book was published nearly 20 years old
raises some questions as to its relevancy today. Several
important themes permeate the book and it is interesting to note
how they have changed with the recent events in the Soviet Union.
The first major theme involves the military doctrine of the
Soviet Union and its ultimate success over the imperialist order.
Throughout the book one will find statements implying directly
and not so directly that the entire reason for the armed forces
of the Soviet Union is to defend the gains of the socialist
revolution against the aggressive capitalists led by the United
States. All major military related developments in the narrative
are framed in the context of reacting to some aggressive and
offensively oriented action performed by the United States and
its allies. The best example is the formation of the Warsaw Pact
in 1955 (p. 212) whicn is characterized as a defensive
organization in response to the formation of NATO in 1949.
However, within this theme of defensiveness, the military
doctrine of the Soviet Union is clearly designed with an
offensive orientation in order to take the war to the enemy (p.
63) and to win any war decisively. Nuclear war is called the
most dangerous form of warfare but consideration of it naturally
occupies the most important place in Soviet military doctrine
because the capitalists (supposedly) are preparing to wage such a
war against the Soviet Union. Thus, similar preparations must
come from the Soviets. Again, the stated goal is to win the war
rapidly and decisively with the premier role given to nuclear
weapons and the Strategic Rocket Forces. While the possibility
of conventional war with no nuclear weapons is also mentioned (p.
63) it is almost as an afterthought. Throughout the discussion
are the implications that a war will be global and involve
coalitions on both sides.
The emphasis on the SRF and nuclear war is further
highlighted in the chapter discussing the armed forces of the
Soviet Union. The forces are listed and discussed in the
following order: Strategic Rocket Forces, the Ground Forces,
Special Troops (included within the Ground Forces but discussed
separately due to their supporting role) , Airborne Forces, Air
Defense, the Air Force, and lastly the Navy. The SRF is again
identified as the main service while the Navy's main task is
given to launching nuclear missile strikes, destroying the atomic
submarines and strike forces of the enemy at sea and at home, and
providing support to land operations. Clearly, no doubt should
exist as to the seriousness given 20 years ago to nuclear war and
the desire to win one should it have happened.
Obviously today the theme of nuclear war and the decisive
impact of nuclear weapons has changed with the advent of
Gorbachev. His denunciation of the utility of nuclear weapons
for war, the live and let live atmosphere directed towards the
West, perestroika, and the resulting debate in the Soviet Union
"reasonable sufficiency" and its impact on the orientation of the
armed forces makes the theme of Soviet Military Doctrine
discussed here (if one believes the Soviet Union is truly
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changing) generally invalid.
Even given this change in their military doctrine, an
interesting contradiction is seen when examining the chronology
at the end of chapter 5 (The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union)
called "Dates of Most Important Events." Here the reader
discovers continual reference to significant military events in
the Soviet Union including the first ballistic missile launch in
1947, the test explosion of a thermonuclear device in 1953, and
the launching of Sputnik in 1957. The dates for the comparable
American events followed. So then, who is the aggressor and who
the reactionary? One can only admire the manner in which the
Soviets play both sides of the fence. One side is used to
justify the doctrine and preparations of the armed forces while
the other side is used to provide proof of the advancements
orchestrated by the CPSU in order to give it an atmosphere of
legitimacy.
The second major theme changing today is the dominating, all
powerful, and all knowing presence of the CPSU in the Soviet
Union. As the organizing nucleus for the entire social system,
the CPSU is set forth as the supreme and ultimate authority. The
tone again emphasizes that the growth and success of the country
is solely due to the efforts and planning of the CPSU and its use
of Marxist-Leninism. Proof of this success is best demonstrated
through a reading of the chronology at the end of chapter 5
already mentioned. All the successes of the Soviet Union (no
failures allowed) are listed in including the victories in the
11
Great Patriotic War, the defeat of the Japanese (without any
other country contributing) , the successful rebuilding and growth
of the Soviet Union following the war, etc.
Today, this theme of the superiority of the CPSU is
obviously in question. The changes within the Soviet Union and
the manner in which Gorbachev is doing them demonstrates his, and
others, recognition that the CPSU and its entire discourse on the
eventual success of Marxist-Leninism in the world has lost
whatever legitimacy it once had. The Soviet people may not have
truly believed the CPSU's claims in any case but at least they
acquiesced while order was maintained and some of the basic needs
met.
The last point of interest which permeates the book is
easily noticed. The Soviets love to quantify and elaborate to
the smallest detail on some relatively minor issue as a means ol:
demonstrating progress and superiority. For example, the
improvement of present submarines to previous ones is shown
through the use of factors: 100 times the power-to-displacement
ratio, 5 times the dividing depth, and 3-4 times the speed.
Another example is provided in the chapter on general reference
data which provides such information as exchange rates, various
geometric formulas, and a discussion on atomic physics, to name
but a few. The basis impression is the great reliance by the
Soviets on scientific and quantification as a means of explaining
and justifying their actions and success.
Though 20 years old and suffering from the changes in the
12
Soviet Union, this is still a useful book to read. Since it is
written for the junior Soviet Officer and covers a variety of
areas, it can. serve as a primer into such areas a*= their military
doctrine (as it once was) , the CPSU, and the general theories of
Marxist-Leninism without getting into extreme detail. It also
provides a look at how the Soviets view themselves and other
societies, especially America and the West.
Thus, The Officer's Handbook is useful if used as an
introduction to the Soviet system prior to digging into other
more detailed works. Even if the changes happening there now
appear to be making the major themes irrelevant, The Officer's




THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
by
N . A . Lomov , ed
.
Reviewed by: RICHARD H. SHIRER, JR.
Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military
Affairs describes the present state of the Soviet military as a
function of scientific determinism, Marxism-Leninism and the
capitalist threat. This book is authored by a distinguished
group of military writers including Maj Gen Cherednichenko, with
an overall editorial supervision by Col-Gen N.A. Lomov, Maj-Gen
I.I. Anureyer and Col M.I. Galkin, who was also the leader of the
group of authors. Col-Gen Lomov, formerly assigned to the
General Staff Academy is the primary editor. The book is part of
the Officer's Library and American editors comments states that
"according to Soviet newspaper reports, it is the seventeenth and
final volume to be issued in the series." Examining every aspect
of Soviet military affairs, the book is a good summary of Soviet
thought up to the time of its publication— 1973.
Written with the same pretentious scientific—truth style of
a Jehovah's witness pamphlet, the book is, nevertheless,
worthwhile reading to understand the Soviet's view of military
affairs. Beginning with a qualitative overview of nuclear and
14
conventional weapons, the authors go on to correlate space
forces, discuss the organization of Soviet forces, make a current
statement of military strategy and explain proper tactics,
methods of troop control and scientific troop leadership—all in
relationship to the scientific-technical revolution.
Scientific technical progress according to the authors is
the natural result of the Industrial Revolution. While the
Soviet Union would be contented to let the benefits of the
scientifical—technical revolution go to the people, the threat
from capitalism necessities that military defense be competitive.
After explaining, in a deterministic Darwinian manner, why these
high tech weapons are necessary, the book qualitatively describes
the balance of weapons both nuclear and conventional. An
interesting paragraph on page 92 gives the West credit with
developing the carrier -- a "major technical achievement" but
says that even in WWII, aviation and submarines were effective
against them. Furthermore, "with the appearance of nuclear
weapons, atomic submarines with homing missiles and torpedos...
the ship is more vulnerable." examples like this point out U.S.
mistakes in military thinking, (it also shows the Soviet tactical
nuclear solution to the carrier)
.
The book discusses the Soviet military organization. It is
the result of scientific application of military principles and
encompasses:










This organization is "correct" and best suited to the perceived
threat in the modern world.
The most significant part of the book expounds Soviet
strategy as a result of scientific—technical progress.
Basically, this means that because of the enormous destructive
power of nuclear weapons, strategic goals must be accomplished
with great accelerity. "The most important strategic principle
is the necessity of providing continuous strategic control over
the armed forces..." The rest of the book goes on to discuss how
to accomplish this through troop control, tactics, scientific
leadership and the spirit of the people and the proper military
doctrine.
Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military
Affairs describes the present state of the Soviet military as a
function of scientific determinism, Marxism-Leninism and the
capitalist threat. This book is authored by a distinguished
group of military writers including Maj Gen Cherednichenko, with
an overall editorial supervision by Col-Gen N.A. Lomov, Maj-Gen
I.I. Anureyer and Col M.I. Galkin, who was also the leader of the
group of authors. Col-Gen Lomov, formerly assigned to the
General Staff Academy is the primary editor. The book is part of
the Officer's Library and American editors comments states that
"according to Soviet newspaper reports, it is the seventeenth and
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final volume to be issued in the series." Examining every aspect
of Soviet military affairs, the book is a good summary of Soviet
thought up to the time of its publication— 1973.
Written with the same pretentious scientific—truth style of
a Jehovah's witness pamphlet, the book is, nevertheless,
worthwhile reading to understand the Soviet's view of military
affairs. Beginning with a qualitative overview of nuclear and
conventional weapons, the authors go on to correlate space
forces, discuss the organization of Soviet forces, make a current
statement of military strategy and explain proper tactics,
methods of troop control and scientific troop leadership—all in
relationship to the scientific-technical revolution.
Scientific technical progress according to the authors is
the natural result of the Industrial Revolution. While the
Soviet Union would be contented to let the benefits of the
scientifical—technical revolution go to the people, the threat
from capitalism necessities that military defense be competitive.
After explaining, in a deterministic Darwinian manner, why these
high tech weapons are necessary, the book qualitatively describes
the balance of weapons both nuclear and conventional. An
interesting paragraph on page 92 gives the West credit with
developing the carrier — a "major technical achievement" but
says that even in WWII, aviation and submarines were effective
against them. Furthermore, "with the appearance of nuclear
weapons, atomic submarines with homing missiles and torpedos...
the ship is more vulnerable." examples like this point out U.S.
17
mistakes in military thinking, ( it also shows the Soviet
tactical nuclear solution to the carrier )
.
The book discusses the Soviet military organization. It is
the result of scientific application of military principles and
encompasses:




3. National Air Defense Force
4 Air Force
5 Navy
This organization is "correct" and best suited to the perceived
threat in the modern world.
The most significant part of the book expounds Soviet
strategy as a result of scientific—technical progress.
Basically, this means that because of the enormous destructive
power of nuclear weapons, strategic goals must be accomplished
with great accelerity. "The most important strategic principle
is the necessity of providing continuous strategic control over
the armed forces..." The rest of the book goes on to discuss how
to accomplish this through troop control, tactics, scientific
leadership and the spirit of the people and the proper military
doctrine.
17a
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONAL ART AND TACTICS
by
V. Ye Sakin
Reviewed by: GLEN C. ACKERMAN
The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics was
published in 1972 in 13,000 copies and was translated and
published under the auspices of the United States Air Force. The
book is part of the Soviet military thought collection.
According to the editor this book is intended for officers and
generals of the Soviet Army, and it was probably the most
important Soviet military publication of that year.
According to Soviet military theorists, military art is
divided into three components: tactics, operational art, and
strategy. This book focuses on operational ar: and tactics from
a Marxist-Leninist point of view with an emphasis on history,
theory, and practical application. The book is divided into
three chapters and covers the gamut of military art (operational
art and tactics) from its beginnings in ancient times to its use
on today's nuclear battlefields.
The first chapter is titled - Principles of Military Art in
works by Military Leaders and Theoreticians of the Past. As the
title suggests, this chapter is a history lesson with a Marxist-
Leninist persuasion. It sets forth the contributions to military
art by pst bourgeois theoreticians and military leaders. Most of
these bourgeois military theorists did not contribute any major
18
scientific generalizations about the laws of armed conflict or
principles of military art according to the author. Rather, they
contributed some good thoughts on tactics and strategy alone.
The author states that "these bourgeois thoughts took place
empirically, proceeding from the immediate demands of practice,
and not on the basis of analysis." He does give credit to one
pre-Lenin Russian general (A.V. Suvorov 1730-1800) as having been
a great theorist and contributor to new principles and tactics.
He further states that this analysis could not be done before the
appearance of Marxist-Leninist teachings. From a Soviet
perspective these themes have merit, yet it seems the author
could have given more credit to Western theorists such as:
Clausewitz, Moltke, Napoleon, and Liddell Hart to name a few. He
also fails to emphasize that the German Army of WWII performed
some fairly impressive operations without the benefit of
Marxists-Leninist teachings!
The other major theme of this chapter deals with change and
evolution of the principles of military art. There are no
constants or eternal principles in military art, they change and
evolve. This is because technology, advances in science, and
thus the means of waging war are ever changing.
The author concludes this chapter by saying the basic
provisions of the theory of Soviet military art have been
confirmed by the experience of war. While confirming Soviet
theories with latter WWII examples he fails to confront the huge
learning curve of 1941-42. Furthermore he gives little credit to
19
the allies or to German problems in other theaters.
The second chapter, Essence and Importance of Principles of
Military Art and of Laws of Armed Warfare, Their Dialectical
Correlation, Use and Classification, states in detail the authors
four laws of war and his two laws of armed conflict. He speaks
of their dialectical correlation (armed conflict is only part of
war) and of their practical utilization. Savkin also lists his
seven basic principles of military art that emerge in the 1950 's
with the adoption of nuclear weapons.
According to Savkin, one cannot understand the laws of war
until one understands the philosophical concept of a law. He
goes into exhausting detail describing what a law, and science
is. A firm understanding of these "laws" is essential to
victory, and violations will doom one to defeat. "History shows
that the violation of laws of armed conflict leads to defeat even
by smaller enemy forces, let alone in battle with a strong an
able foe." As with his point that technology, science, and thus
wars are ever changing, this theme is fairly straightforward. An
army obviously needs to follow certain "laws", which at times can
seem to be common sense, to be victorious. One can find numerous
"upsets" in history to show his point. Yet, some of these
"upsets" did occur before Marxist-Leninist "laws" were described.
Therefore these points lose some merit.
The final theme of this chapter is the fact that the laws of
war, laws of armed conflict, and the principle of military art
are closely related. But, their mixing is a mistake and that
20
this is a major problem among bourgeois military theorists. This
is an interesting concept that seems to have worked well for the
Soviets since 1943. Savkin concludes chapter two with practical
examples of military art.
The final chapter, Summary of the Basic Principles of
Operational Art and Tactics, is the real heart of the book and it
focuses on the second phase of development of the Soviet armed
forces (1953-1959) . It is during this phase of development that
operational art and tactics changed the greatest. The change
according to Savkin was due to technological advances, and the
possible employment of nuclear weapons.
Savkin's seven principles of military art; mobility,
concentration of effort, surprise, combat activeness,
preservation of the combat effectiveness of friendly force,
conformity of the goal and plan of operation, and coordination;
are graphically explained with numerous historical and
contemporary examples. His main emphasis is on mobility, high
rates of combat operations, and concentration of effort. With
his focus on these three principles of military art, Savkin calls
for their use in conjunction with nuclear strikes.
In the overall analysis it seems Colonel Savkin is trying to
put out three main themes. First, science and technology are
ever changing and influencing war and the military. Therefore
the laws of war, laws of armed conflict, and the principles of
military art are ever changing. Yet, most bourgeois military
theorists have not realized this. Second, understanding the laws
21
and principles, and their proper use is essential to attain
victory. It seems that only Soviets understand this due to their
Marxist-Leninist ideology. Finally, the author believes that
nuclear weapons can and should by used on today's modern
battlefield.
Savkin articulates his themes well, but as with most Soviet
writers he has a selective memory when reviewing history. The
West, though certainly not Germany, may well be behind in it's
study of war, laws, and principles. But, this is certainly not
attributable to its lack of Marxist-Leninist ideology. His view
on nuclear weapons in modern warfare is interesting from today's
point of view because it seems his time frame was off. According
to the American editor, due to editorial caveats, the stipulated
time frame (53-59) should be contemporary nature of the subject
matter. It seems that with the limitations on numbers and
sophistication of nuclear weapons during this time frame,
especially in the early to mid 1950 's, it would seem that the
editor is correct. Whether Savkin 's book is of a historical or
contemporary nature is not as important as it's valuable insights
into Soviet ideas on operational art and tactics. It should be
required reading for most field grade U.S. Army officers!
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The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin and
Problems of Contemporary War
by
A.S. Milovidov, Editor-in-chief; V.G. Kozlov, Editor.
Reviewed by: TAMARA ADAMS
The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin and Problems of
Contemporary War was written by a group of authors who, as the
title suggests, attempted to place "the problems of contemporary
war" within the context of Lenin's teachings. Published in 1972,
the book came out in 27,000 copies, suggesting that it was "meant
lfor wide educational use within the Soviet Military."
Since the book was meant for such wide use within the Soviet
military, it is not surprising to find that the book presents a
generalized view of military doctrine according to party line.
The first five chapters deal with the socio-political aspects of
military doctrine. For example, the book addresses the
difference between just and unjust wars according to Lenin.
Lenin's thesis, according to the book's authors, was that
"peace. . . will advance the cause to an infinitely greater extent
2than war" and that as such, "our army [the Soviet Army] has
been, is now, and will continue to be an army of peace, a
1Milovidov, General-Major A.S. and Kozlov, Colonel V.G.,
Editors, The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin and Problems of
Contemporary War , Moscow, 1972. English translation, Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, p. v.
2 Ibid., p. 17.
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3dependable bulwark of security for all people."
While the idea of "peace" sounds comforting to most Western
ears, it is important to note that the word has qu ; t^. a different
meaning to Soviets. The authors of Problems in Contemporary War
make this clear in their discussion of just versus unjust wars.
"Just wars," according to the book, are "progressive" whereas
4
"unjust" wars are "reactionary." The book identifies
imperialism as "the source of all antagonistic conflicts of the
5present-day world, the source of war danger." Even so, just
wars are acceptable and include "wars in defense of the socialist
homeland" and are governed by a policy of active defense of the
peace and strengthening of international security ... [a policy
which] is permeated with a spirit of internationalism and
solidarity with revolutionary progressive forces throughout the
world." As such, the Soviets view their armed forces and the
armed forces of their allies as "a bulwark of all freedom-loving
7peoples.
"
According to the book, Lenin's philosophy is one of non-
aggression; in fact, of the belief that were it not for
3 . .Ibid., p. 20. Taken from L.I. Brezhnev: Delo Lenina zhivet
i pobezhdavet . (Lenin's Cause Is Alive and Is Triumphing),
Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p. 21.
4 Ibid., p. 29.
5Ibid., p. 30
6Ibid., p. 42.
7 Ibid., p. 51.
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imperialist aggression, the proletariat would not need such a
powerful army for "defense of the socialist homeland."
Paradoxically,. however, the authors speak o^ the "external
function of the socialist army," carefully noting that "with the
emergence of socialism beyond the boundaries of a single country
and the establishment of a world socialist system, the external
function of defense of the entire socialist camp in cooperation
with the other fraternal armies. It essentially functions as a
constituent part of the international armed forces of
9 . .
socialism." The dimensions of the "socialist homeland," under
good defense," according to viewpoints presented in the book,
"should always be conducted offensively."
After the discussion of the socio-political aspects of war
in Problems of Contemporary War , the authors present Soviet
scientific and technical aspects of war according to Lenin. The
authors pay particular attention to the development of the armed
forces, the training and education of the troops, and the
importance of economics in defense. In addition, they stress the
nature of the ideological struggle between socialism and
capitalism and the necessity of cultural indoctrination and
morale building in the Soviet system. "Ideological conditioning





10Ibid., p. 107. Taken from K. Marx and F. Engles, Soch
(Works) , Volume 15, p. 260.
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11
part of the Soviet military's training and education tactics.
Likewise, it is seen as important to break the morale of
enemy forces. That this is a part of Soviet military doctrine is
apparent in the following excerpt:
The goals in ideological struggle in warfare can
be divided purely arbitrarily into strategic and
tactical goals. The strategic goal is determined
by the political goals of warfare and is connected
with the war plan as a whole . . . The tactical
(operational) goal of agitation - propaganda work
against enemy troops and population lies in
undermining or weakening the morale of a specific
group of enemy troops and the populace of adjoining
regions, as well as stopping enemy ideological
diversions against our own troops and populace.
Another important thesis of Lenin that is brought out in the
book is "the necessity of combining various types of weapons, of
13being prepared to utilize potential forms of combat." Along
with this broad vision, the authors of the book point out how
such elements as physical training, achieving total literacy and
"borrowing everything of value from European and American
14
science" contributes to the outcome of a potential war.
According to the soviet viewpoint, "modern warfare is not an
impersonal clash between missiles," but requires self-sacrifice.
Training Soviet troops to fight such a battle "consists in
forming in personnel communist convictions and excellent moral-
nibid., p. 132.
12 Ibid., p. 211.
13 Ibid., p. 150.
14 Ibid., pp. 170, 174.
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combat and psychological qualities, ensuring constant readiness
for combat, intellectual and spiritual firmness, and an
15invincible will to fight to victory."
Generally, the themes in Problems of Contemporary War are
presented in a logical, straightforward manner. Occasionally,
the themes begin to sound like propaganda as the authors attempt
to glorify Soviet ideology and approach to war by contrasting it
with capitalistic views. Occasionally, the authors seem to
contradict themselves. For example, they identify civil defense
as undesirable because it "intensifies the reactionary nature of
internal policy, promotes the deterioration of a country to a
military dictatorship, and greatly broadens the sphere of
militarism." Almost in the same breath, they defend Soviet
civil defense activities with the assertion that "socialist
17humanitarianism" permeates all such activities. Of course, the
difference between capitalist and Soviet civil defense is easily
explained, from the Soviet viewpoint, by the nature of just
versus unjust wars.
In spite of occasional resemblance to propaganda, The
Problems of Contemporary War is very informative and worthwhile.






students of Lenin's military-theoretical heritage," the book is
currently a good base document for American officers and generals
to rely on for a fairly accurate picture of the Soviet view on
war during the 1970s. Since understanding Lenin is an essential
part of understanding Soviet military doctrine's heritage and
traditional direction, the book is useful for those interested in
contrasting past military doctrine with current events in an
effort to judge the authenticity of the Soviet Union's claim to a
changing doctrine. As such, the book is important, maybe even
critical for anyone who purports to understand the significance






MARXISM-LENINISM ON WAR AND ARMY
by
B. Byely, et. al.
Reviewed by: SCOTT A. KELLY
Marxism-Leninism on War and Army is "listed in the Great
Soviet Encyclopedia as a basic reference for the subject of
military doctrine." "It is identified for the attention of Soviet
officers, generals and admirals." This book is made up of a
collective of military authors, ranging from Captain 1st Rank up
to Major-General . The book was printed by Progress Publishers in
Moscow in 1972 and released under the "auspices of the United
States Air Force in 1973."
The book maintains that Marxism-Leninism is the theoretical
foundation of Soviet Military doctrine and military science and
that the leadership of the CPSU is the fundamental basis underlying
all Soviet military development. "The elaboration of Soviet
military doctrine, which was generalized the military experience
in our epoch, the emergence and development of Soviet military
science, are organically linked with Marxist-Leninist philosophy." 1
A major theme that runs throughout the book is the likelihood
of and preparation for a thermonuclear war between the two opposing
social systems (capitalism and socialism) . This seems to be in
Col. B. Byely et al., Marxism-Leninism on War and Army .
Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, publisher under the auspices of
the U.S. Air Force, USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1974, p. 294.
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line with most of the other Soviet military writings at the times
between the period 1966-1974 which "centered on how to carry out
the various operations called for in the conduc 4- of a general
nuclear war.
"
The book contends that a nuclear war would still be a
continuation of politics by violent means, only that it would be
different in scale and the qualitative ways in achieving political
aims. It also states that once war comes it will be an all out
nuclear war and brands the United States "flexible response" stance
as senseless.
The book evidences the serious thought and preparation the
Soviets take towards a future nuclear war. Firstly, the authors
accept the massive losses of lives as an inevitable part of the
war. The text notes "huge, irreplaceable losses as a typical
feature of nuclear missile war." 4 The authors also consider
reconstitution efforts after massive nuclear exchanges. They
mention that some parts of industrial and economic enterprises
would survive and that "the remaining enterprises would be engaged
2 . ...Edward L. Warner III, Soviet concepts and capabilities for
Limited Nuclear War: What We Know and How We Know It (Santa
Monica, Ca: Rand Corp., 1989). 17.
3Col. N. Byely et al., Marxism-Leninism on War and Army .
Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, published under the auspices of
the U.S. Air Force, USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1974, p. 29.
4Ibid., p. 276.
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in the production of weapons and in catering to the needs of the
population who have survived the bombings and radiation." 5
The book discusses certain areas and concern" that need to be
addressed prior to the capitalists unleashing of the next world
war. Firstly, it emphasizes preparedness for the future. When
talking of the initial German attack in 1941, the authors mention
the first strikes of the German troops and the serious setbacks of
the Soviet Army. 6 Concomitantly, the book promotes the offense as
the principle character in conducting a future war vice the defense
as espoused by the current leadership today.
Secondly, the authors engage in mirror imaging concerning the
need for massive armies, for modern wars could not be waged without
them." 7 They mention the necessity of a 3:1 ratio in forces to
secure the successful outcome of armed struggle in war. This force
ratio is essentially still in line with Soviet military writings
today. Additionally, the book infers the continual need to build
up arms. The authors state that "victory and defeat of the warring
states, the course and the outcome of wars, depends on the whole
o
directly on the correlation of their military power."
Thirdly, the Soviets voice a fear of the U.S. Navy in a future






belief that the "navy was to have command over fifty percent of the
U.S. nuclear potential." 9 Additionally, they refer to the ability
of the enemy to strike his opponent's deep rear by using missiles
of an "operational-tactical designation carried by aircraft and
submarines, especially atomic-powered submarines." 10
Lastly, the Soviets show obvious concern that they are lagging
behind the capitalist nations in technology and flag its extreme
importance in the coming war. The book refers to the socialist
camp as having a pronounced advantage over the capitalist society
in regards to development and application of the social sciences.
It doesn't mention, however, the socialist camp having a distinct
advantage in the natural sciences and technology, implying a sense
of inferiority. The authors also state a fear of the capitalist
camp surprising the Soviets with a new technology at the initial
onset of war.
A second but lesser theme that runs throughout this book is
the Soviet's resolve for the exportation of revolution abroad; the
support for national liberation movements in Third World countries.
The Soviets considered it their duty to help the oppressed peoples
against imperialism. The book mentions the "defence of the
socialist countries being indissoluble from the granting of




peoples oppressed by imperialism." 11 Today, the Soviets seem to
have given up outright support for national liberation movements.
This book shows how the teachings of Marxism-Leninism drive
the development of Soviet military doctrine. It emphasizes the
inevitability and survivability of a nuclear war and the subsequent
need for preparation. It also emphasizes the continued resolve of
the Soviets to export revolution to Third World countries. I
recommend this book be read by anyone serious in studying Soviet
military literature.
11 Ibid., p. 127.
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THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOVIET STATE
by
A. A. Grechko
Reviewed by: ROBERT J. WHITE
It is often noted that the Soviet system relies on
several key institutions in order to implement policy and control
society. The armed forces are always considered among the key
social constituent parts used by the state to enforce political
and social discipline. In his book, The Armed Forces of the
Soviet State , Soviet Marshal Grechko utilized his authority as
Soviet Minister of Defense to analyze a variety of political,
social, and technological issues that were affecting the army and
Soviet society. The book, by its significant print run (300,000
copies) , was intended to reach a wide segment of the professional
officer corps as well as Communist Party (CPSU) functionaries.
The twelfth and final volume of the US Air Force's Soviet
Military Thought series of translations, Grechko 's book is a
wide-ranging commentary on the significance of the armed forces
in Soviet society.
A major theme that is evident throughout the book is the
inseparability of the army with the political policy of the CPSU.
Lenin, utilizing military and social principles that are as
relevant today as they were in the first years of the Soviet
state, created a new and ultimately invincible force in the Red
Army. The triumph of the Bolsheviks and the defeat of counter-
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revolutionary groups is interpreted as the true proof of Lenin's
military genius. Armed with Leninist principles, Grechko argues
that the Soviet army and the CPSU represent a new and
irreversible force in the history of the world.
Grechko, by stressing the scientific correctness of the
Leninist interpretations and the leading role for the CPSU in
society, illustrates the great significance Soviets attach to
rigid centralization. Individual initiative is to be discouraged
in the army. The leadership of the CPSU is by definition
infallible, and as such the army is the representation of the
Party.
In Grechko • s analysis, a review of Soviet military history
validates the social and military policy of the CPSU and the
correctness of a class-based analysis of the international
system. Thus, in reference to the Soviet victory in the Great
Patriotic War, the war's outcome was "historically determined and
1 . .
axiomatic." Based on the dialectical analysis of history and
the contemporary international system, Grechko and the Soviets
are in a totally unique position to observe the contradictions of
the capitalist system and its ultimate transforation into a
system of proletarian internationalism. The very legitimacy of
the CPSu and the role of the army is a reflections of the
scientific analysis of historical events and the world system.
However, as a socialist state in a hostile international
A. A. Grechko. The Armed Forces of the Soviet State .
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975), 63.
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system, the army and the Party must be constantly prepared for
political and possibly armed conflict with the imperialist
states. Accordingly, Grechko argues that the de^T^e forces of
the state are by definition to be accorded preeminence in
resource allocation. Grechko clearly believes that the CPSU has
no more important mission that to ensure the defense of the
Revolution from imperialist aggression. In reality, this has
meant that the USSR has historically endured a major burden for
defense, and Grechko never addresses at what point defense
spending may actually detract from overall national vitality.
This commitment of resources to the armed forces is
reguired, according to Grechko, due to the changes in warfare
that have occurred as a result of scientific progress. Due to
these changes, it is crucial that the Soviets strive to maintain
technological modernity in their armed forces. This is
especially critical in light of the advent of nuclear weapons,
which constitute the principle factor of modern war and pose the
greatest danger to the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, Grechko draws a clear link between the
advancement of Soviet scientific abilities and the proficiency of
the armed forces. Inherent in the belief that science has
sparked a revolution in military affairs is the implicit warning
of dire military conseguences should the Soviets ignore
technological progress. Indeed, the changes engendered by
nuclear weapons are so significant that in modern times the
Strategic Rocket Forces "compromise the combat might of the
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Soviet Armed Forces" and appear to be the most important service
2in Grechko s view. More broadly, scientific progress has
changed conduct of war, with time more concentrated and space
constrained. Overall, Grechko appears to accept that future war
will be fought with nuclear weapons, and as such the Soviet armed
3forces must be able to prevail.
The influence of scientific change and its affect on
military science is one of the principle themes of the book.
Grechko clearly not only wants the armed forces to understand the
changes resulting from technology, but is also lecturing the
Party on the criticality of technological progress. The Party
must make the political effort to ensure that the armed forces
are equipped with the latest weapons.
A key mission for the Soviet army is political
socialization. Fortified by the class dialectic, the Soviet view
is that the armed forces represent the natural aspirations of the
people. The Soviet armed forces also represent in Soviet society
a monopolization of political indoctrination and a key link
between the political agenda of the Party and transmitting this
agenda to the masses.
Grechko provides what might be called a traditional view of
Soviet military science. The necessity of the offensive, mass,
and total defeat of the enemy emerge as the cornerstones of
2 Ibid., p. 79.
3 Ibid . , p. 164.
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Soviet doctrine. However, despite the book's emphasis on
science, it is vague on how and to what extent technology has
changed or made obsolete these key concepts.
Grechko s book is a broad analysis on a variety of topics
designed to appeal to a wide audience. Due to the number of
issues addressed, the book does not go into great depth on any
particular topic with the possible exception of the scientific-
technological revolution and its effects on the military.
Written during the conservative Brezhnev era, Grechko ' s book is
an example of what might be termed traditional Soviet doctrine.
The book should appeal to Western analysts who are seeking
examples of Soviet attempts to educate wide segments to educate
wide segments of their armed forces.
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THE INITIAL PERIOD OF WAR
BY
S . P . IVANOV
Reviewed by: ERIN K. MARLOW
THE INITIAL PERIOD OF WAR , by S. P. Ivanov is an extremely
important book that uses the historical lessons of World War II
(The Great Patriotic War) to describe the importance of the
initial period of war, as well as the way in which the initial
period of war would be waged by the Soviet Union in the 1970s,
1980s and, if forced, probably today. The author was assigned as
the Superintendent of the Academy of the General Staff when this
work was published (1972) and it is probably intended for General
Officer and military planning staff consumption.
Given the Soviet requirements necessary in order to wage war
(economic, political, military and morale viability) it is likely
that the Soviets would do everything in their power to avoid war
today because the economic, political and morale factors are not
up to the required standard. The historical lessons of this book
point out what these specific requirements are and when analyzed
in light of current East European events the aforementioned
proposition becomes clear.
There are a few lessons and/or main points that are
repeated throughout the book and an understanding of these
lessons is of the utmost importance for the United States/NATO
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military planner. One must understand how the opponent is to
wage war in order to correctly interpret indications and warnings
signals or, more fundamentally, to understand if the conditions,
as the Soviets see them, exist which would allow them to wage
war.
The first set of lessons allow the author to pay homage to
the greatness of the Communist Party (as is required in the
Soviet Union to lend credibility to the authenticity and
"correctness" of the work) and set the book in the correct
context for political acceptability. It is the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) that is responsible for mobilizing the
people of the Soviet Union to repel the "mortal enemy" and will
do this via"... vigilance discipline, and development of hatred
for the enemy." The government of the Soviet Union may/will be
reorganized in order to accomplish this task and this may serve
as an initial indicator of malevolent intent. Given the on-going
unrest and political upheaval that is taking place within the
Soviet Union it is unlikely at this given point in time that the
Soviet military leadership would feel confident that the CPSU
could deliver on this stated responsibility.
Likewise, the morale and political factors and psychological
conditioning of the troops that engage in combat are extremely
important to the outcome of the initial period of war. The
Soviet system is far superior to that of the West, so Ivanov





believes, because it is based upon the Marxist-Leninist dialectic
and is properly managed by the CPSU. Any war would be forced
upon the Soviets by a capitalist system and the Soviet response
would be the "just war." However the credibility of the Marxist-
Lenin system upon which this premise rests is at risk as a whole
and it is doubtful that, given the current events in Eastern
Europe, as well the recent defeat (or non-win) in Afghanistan,
that the people of the Soviet Union that may be subject to
conscription would be conductive to this conditioning.
Finally the government and military organs of the Soviet
Union will use all means and methods available to include
military, political and diplomatic actions to conceal their plans
in order to gain time and ensure surprise . This lesson indicates
support for the Marxist theory that all facets of Soviet life
(political, economic, military and morale) will be involved in
the struggle. It also confirms the Western suspicion that
"maskirova" and "khitrost" will be used to deny correct
information about Soviet intent .
The Soviet intent for a war that would be waged today is to
include as many men and eguipment as possible in the first attack
in order to achieve immediate strategic goals which include
gaining air and sea supremacy. All branches of the military will
be used as well as the most decisive forms of conducting
operations. To the Soviet military mind these decisive forms
include splitting the enemy's strategic fronts, encircling large
groups of enemy forces, and making deep envelopments with mobile
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formations (tanks and armored units) and air power. Because the
Soviets place such a high emphasis on gaining air superiority,
PVO air defenses will no doubt be strengthened ir order to deny
the same advantage to the enemy. The Soviet military threat is
still a formidable one even today because it holds a nuclear
capability and is designed for the strategic offensive defense.
Ivanov points out that the most instructive lesson of the initial
period of war was the need to conduct an active strategic defense
2(Which for the Soviets is offensive)
.
The book also points out a major stress upon a vital
retention of command and control. The Soviet penchant for
communications redundancy probably still provide an adequate
ability to maintain this capability initially. The final stress
is put upon maintaining significant strategic reserves (across
the board) that allow for an execution of the strategic defense.
As already mentioned this is probably not a reliable source today
because the people that make up the reserve are either largely
ethnic non-Russian Soviets.
Overall this is a very instructive work that depicts the way
in which a true modern Marxist-Leninist would wage war, however
the Marxist-Leninist may be a dying breed. Only time will tell.
2 Ibid. p. 309.
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THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES YESTERDAY AND TODAY
by
V. Ryabov
Reviewed by: ROSS DICKERSON
V. Ryabov' s book, The Soviet Armed Forces Yesterday and
Today , is a description of the Soviet military and the reasons
for its existence. It was written in 1976 and was specifically
targeted for Western audiences. Ryabov divides his book into
four chapters which cover the early years of the Red Army (1917-
1922), between the wars (1922-1939), World War Two (1939-1945),
and the post-war period (1945-1976). Ryabov's main themes
include the following: (1) the need for the Red Army to counter
the West's imperialist goals, (2) victory due to Soviet
engagement in "just versus unjust wars," (3) the need for a large
superior economy based on heavy industry, (5) the right to defend
socialism outside the Soviet Union's borders, and (6) the
superiority of Soviet military science over all other Western
military theories.
Ryabov stresses the need for the Soviet Armed Forces to
defend the homeland against imperialist aggressors throughout the
book. He constantly emphasizes that the West has attempted to
destroy the peace-loving peoples of the Soviet Union from the
October Revolution to the present day. The Soviets, of course,
have no aggressive intentions and the only reason that the Red
Army exists is to protect the Soviet people and the socialist
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allies. Ryabov also states that World War Two was a Western
conspiracy to weaken and/or destroy the Soviet Union, and he
claims that the West did little (even in the Pacific Theater) to
aid the Soviet Union in ending the war. He claims it was the
Soviet victories in China that forced Japan to surrender. "The
atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki . . . did not
influence the course of the war."
Ryabov attributes all Red Army victories to the fact that
the Soviets fought just wars. He does not, however, digress into
a dialectic of just and unjust wars as does some other Soviet
literature. This appears to be an attempt to avoid excessive
rhetoric and maintain the interest of the potential Western
reader.
Throughout the book Ryabov emphasizes the Soviet need for a
large army backed up with massive quantities of reserves and
supplies. This theme was mentioned in every chapter and is
indicative of the Soviet military experience throughout history
as well as an explanation to the West for the current size of the
Soviet military. Ryabov consistently reassures the reader that
the enormous size of the Soviet military is strictly for defense
against all potential imperialist aggressors.]
The need for a large economy based on heavy industry is also
Ryabov, V. The Soviet Armed Forces Yesterday and Today
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976): 114.
2Ryabov, 29, 37. References concerning just wars of the
defense of the homeland and the proletariat are usually taken
from V.I. Lenin's Collected Works .
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mentioned throughout the book. This compliments the Soviet
desire for a large standing army with large reserves and
supplies— all are indicative of the past Soviet military
experience.
Another theme Ryabov stresses throughout the book is the
Soviet right to defend socialism outside the Soviet borders. He
states that the "Soviet soldiers crossed the border not as
3invaders and enslavers, but as liberators. . . . " He also
states that the Soviet Union is on the best of terms with their
Eastern European friends. There is (as can be expected) no
mention of the 180,000 square miles the Soviet Union annexed
during World War II excluding the subjugation of Eastern Europe.
Finally, Ryabov emphasizes the superiority of Soviet
military science over "the much-lauded military theories of Nazi
5 ...Germany." This theme, common in Soviet literature, is actually
applied to all Western military theories since Ryabov lumps the
Wehrmacht in with all imperialist armies.
The reader must beware not to make a hasty conclusion that
Ryabov considers the Soviet Union to be a major naval power. He
mentions this only once, and all subsequent references to
sailors in the book portray the Soviet Navy's participation in
3Ryabov, 98.
4Russel Stolfi, notes from "History of Europe, 1914-1950,"
29 November 1989, Naval Postgraduate School. The areas annexed




This book, because it was written for Western dissemination,
is significantly different from Soviet literature published
specifically for Soviet readers. The book is easy to read and
understand for two primary reasons: it is set up in a Western-
style format, and it keeps to a minimum the normally massive
amounts of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric. This book also de-
emphasizes the use of nuclear weapons, offensive strategies, and
it does not excessively attack Western and U.S. policies in the
usual Soviet fashion.
In conclusion, The Soviet Armed Forces Yesterday and Today
appears to be written to thoroughly convince the West of the
Soviet Union's peaceful intentions and the Red Army's historic
and honorable history. For all of the above mentioned reasons
and the fact that the book is written on a very basic doctrinal
level, The Soviet Armed Forces Yesterday and Today is recommended
only as an overview of how the Soviet's view their own army's
history and interaction with the West since 1917 as well as an
introduction to basic and over-simplified Soviet ideas on




THE COMMAND AND STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY AIR FORCE IN
THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR 1941-194 5
by
M. N. KOZHEVNIKOV
Reviewed by: SUSAN L. THEODORELOS
Translated and published under the auspices of the United
States Air Force. 70,000 copies were printed and with the intent
to demonstrate the activities of the Soviet Army Air Force during
the Great Patriotic War and the role of Stavka in coordinating
operations.
"When Germany suddenly launched a massive attack on the
Soviet Union in June 1941, Soviet Air Force units in the western
border were caught in the midst of an extensive rearmament
1 ...program." Forced on the defensive, the Soviet Air Force command
and staff elements hastily instituted a reorganization of the
Soviet Army Air Force to counter the rapidly advancing Germans.
As a result, the valuable combat experience was to prove
invaluable in the conduct of future air operations. The key was
centralization.
This is the author's main thesis throughout the book.
Kozhevnikov was a member of the WS command and staff during the
Great Patriotic War which provided first hand and insightful
pg. vii
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information regarding the operations and tactics used, problems
with those operations and tactics and the resulting solutions.
The book is divided into seven chapters + v e t trace the
progression of the war through the consolidation of the Army Air
Force to the Battle of Kursk and the Concluding Period of the
War. The last chapter is dedicated to the Far East emphasizing
the preparations for combat and combat actions in 1945.
The book is, literally, "littered" with numbers of tanks,
motorized divisions, aircraft bombers and fighters perhaps to
further emphasize the use of tactics but this makes for very
difficult reading. Additionally, throughout the book are the
obligatory salutations to the "heros," and honorable mentions of
the staff and leadership.
In a nutshell, the specific lessons learned can be broken
down into five items (10 the predictions and fundamental premises
of Soviet Military Art regarding WS employment were confirmed.
Strategic air supremacy was vital to create favorable conditions
for ground and naval forces in major operations by groups of
fronts simultaneously. As well the premise of prewar Soviet
Military Art show two forms of struggle, daily fighting and WS
air ops to destroy enemy air groupings. (2) Soviet Air Force
"operational art" was enriched by a new form of frontal aviation
combat called the air offensive. This was deemed necessary to
provide continuous air support to advancing troops. Special
attentions is given to aviation actions in encirclement
operations by ground troops. These were used to isolate large
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groups, encircle the enemy and prevent resupply by air. This
information would have proved useful for the Berlin Blockade.
(3) Soviet Military Art solved the problem of ^-ing long range
aviation in the war by using independent air operations verses
previous isolated strikes. (4) Soviet Military Art solved the
problem of tactical coordination of aviation with ground units
and formations. Strategic offensive operations were coordinated
by Stavka while operation coordination was handled by the front
commanders. (5) Finally, Soviet Military Art solved the problem
of controlling aviation. Front aviation air armies were found
viable because they permitted commanders to control all aviation
at their disposal centrally and satisfy the requirements for
efficient coordination with ground troops.
The author claims that further study is necessary to better
organize and conduct battle for strategic air supremacy, massing
aviation efforts in ground force sectors and organizing WS
coordination with ground force and the Navy with the Senior air
chief.
This is book that one would have to read two or three times
in order to wade through the extraneous names and numbers to
really get down to the substance of how the Great Patriotic War
changed the way Soviets approach aviation management. As
mentioned before, centralization is the key.
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Reviewed by: TOM CHASSEE
The Soviet Armed Forces: A History of Their Organizational
Development : Is a book written primarily for domestic Soviet
consumption by both Soviet officers and enlisted men. The book
was written to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the Great October
Socialist Revolution and the sixtieth anniversary of the creation
of the Soviet armed forces. It is concerned primarily with the
problems attending the growth and development of the Soviet Armed
Forces and links these changes with the economic, sociopolitical,
scientific-technological, and internal changes that have
concurrently occurred in the USSR.
The authors cite on of the most important periods in the
organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces as being the
years between the two world wars. This period uncovers the first
major theme of the book, that being the definition of the offensive
as the main and decisive from of combat. This idea of the
offensive was manifested in the concept of the "deep thrust."
"Deep trust" is understood to mean the simultaneous annihilation,
neutralization, and containment not only of those defending troops
supposed to repel a frontal attack, but also of those
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troops stationed in the enemy's operational depth.
Additionally, that success in these operations would be attained
by the combined efforts of all services and branches of the armed
forces. In these deep operations motorized and tank formations
would play the decisive role with double echeloned groups of 30
to 4 tanks per kilometer of breakthrough gap in the sector of
the main thrust. The breakthrough exploitation echelon of this
operation would then exploit the tactical success into
operational depth. The authors site the first use of a "deep
thrust" operation as occurring in 1939 against the Japanese army
in the Khalka river region of the Soviet Far East. The resulting
crushing military defeat of the Japanese forces was of great
military and political importance, it compromised Japan's
military status, and she was obliged to review her strategic
plans.
The concept of the offensive was further developed during
the Great Patriotic War. Although, the authors admit that due
to the Soviet Unions unpreparedness at the out break of
hostilities an initial period of strategic defense followed by
the use of counter-offensives occurred before strategic
offensives were conducted. It is during this period that the
authors bring forth another key theme, that being the Soviet
Unions superior productive capacity enabled it to conduct
counter-offensives and ultimately strategic offensives to bring
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about Germanies defeat. From November 1942 through December 194 3
this productive capacity enabled an irreversible trend in the
correlation of forces, causing the Soviet Army to gain a two fold
superiority over German forces in tanks and artillery, and
threefold in aircraft. This superior correlation of forces
enabled the Soviet Union to seek a decisive turning point in the
war, which was provided by the counter-offensives at Stalingrad
and Kursk. By 1944 the correlation of forces ultimately reaches
a four fold superiority in guns, three fold in tanks, and eight
fold in aircraft.
The point is then made that by Soviet industry being able to
improve the quality and quantity of equipment of the ground
forces, enabled the conduct of large scale offensive operations.
Conducted by group of fronts, directed toward attainment of
decisive goals. These strategic operations made it possible to
select the most advantageous axes and time, assure the element of
surprise, pin down the enemy's reserves, force ones plans on him,
and maintain a firm hold on the strategic initiative. The
authors give the ultimate example of the art of strategic
leadership as the 1945 Soviet Campaign in the Far East, stating
that this campaign was unparalleled during World War II. That it
was an offensive campaign conducted on a 5000 kilometer front at
a depth of 600 to 800 kilometers and smashed the Japanese
Kwantung Army in 2 5 days.
During the period of the Great Patriotic War the authors
also make special mention of the great contribution to securing a
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decisive change in the war made by the Soviet partisans. That by
1943 they were occupying the attention of 25 German divisions.
This may be- a plug for Soviet airborne fore : which would
accomplish a similar mission of interdicting and occupying enemy
forces in the rear, preventing their use at the front.
The chapters covering the post war development of the Soviet
Armed Forces begin with two quotes, one made by President Truman
"We are now in possession of a weapon that will not only
revolutionize war but can alter the course of history and
civilization," and the second by General Maxwell Taylor "That in
the atomic bomb we had the absolute weapon which would permit the
United States, its sole possessor, to police the world through
the threat of its use." These two quotes, made by Americans,
would certainly seem to epitomize the importance that the Soviets
give to the possession, and potential use of nuclear weapons.
The authors state that an important aspect of military
technological progress during the first postwar years was that
the Soviets develop and test their own nuclear missiles. This
would enable a Soviet accomplishment in the revolution of
military affairs, thwart aggressive plans of imperialism,
preserve peace, and strengthen the position of socialism.
The Soviets then envisioned a future war which would be
waged between two diametrically opposed social systems,
coalitional, world wide in scope, and waged with nuclear
missiles. Additionally, Soviet military doctrine dictated that
nuclear missiles ensured future wars would be of short duration.
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With the advent of nuclear weapons the authors observe that tanks
and infantry combat vehicles (ICV's) still occupy an important
place in the
_
ground forces armament system. They state that
tanks and ICV's armor makes them resistant to shock wavers,
protects the crews from penetrating radiation, and that they can
promptly exploit the results of nuclear bursts. The importance
of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) is also emphasized. The
authors stating that the SRF's are the principal and decisive
means of achieving the goals of war, by undermining an aggressors
military and economic potential, annihilating his strategic means
of nuclear attack, and destroying his main military groupings.
The book's mention of the Soviet Navy's role, at least until
the end of the Great Patriotic War, is one of supporting the
ground forces in the combined arms concept. Although, the
authors do make mention that the experience of World War II
confirmed the great importance of Naval forces. With the post
World War II revolution caused by the introduction of nuclear
weapons, the book sites an even greater increase in the
importance of Naval forces. The authors state that during this
period of the position of the USSR as a great sea power missile
submarines and aircraft armed with nuclear missiles becoming the
2
main striking force of the Soviet navy. The authors conclude
that the relative importance of the Soviet navy has risen
considerably as befits the status of the USSR as a great sea
2 Ibid., p. 415.
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3power, and that the Soviet navy can exert a very significant and
at times decisive influence on the course of war.
One of the curious omissions I found in the book was the
lack of mention concerning the use of chemical and biological
weapons, either by the Soviet Armed Forces or the imperialists.
There may be a significant rational behind this omission, or the
authors may have grouped their use with the employment of nuclear
weapons.
This book gives a broad overview and chronological
development of all branches of the Soviet Armed Forces including
the important doctrine and concepts governing their use. As such
it would be a useful book for anyone needing a quick grounding
and one book reference concerning the Armed Forces of the Soviet
Union.
3 Ibid., p. 165.
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LOCAL WAR - HISTORY AND THE PRESENT DAY
by
I. Ye. Sharov
Reviewed by: CARL R. GRAHAM
Local War came out in an edition of 30,000 copies and was
expressly written for scientific workers, teachers, and
propagandists. This suggests that the book was written as an
official version or explanation of past events, as well as a
possible justification for Soviet actions of the period. These
events and activities include arms programs and Soviet
involvement either directly or by proxy in local wars throughout
the world.
The book examines trends and developments of local wars from
the 19th century through the later 1970s. Its stated purpose is
to seek useful lessons from case studies of particular wars e.g.
Arab/Israeli conflicts, Korea, and Vietnam. These lessons can
then be used to document the decay of the Imperialist system and
perhaps provide lessons for the Socialist camp. Shavrov gives
many tools to aid in the search for these lessons, leading the
reader down a path to the author's own inevitable conclusions,
even though many of his conclusions seem to be implied rather
than stated.
Shavrov begins by defining local war in terms of its scope
and content. Local wars, he says, are limited in the scale of
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their operations. Limitation may be by geographic area, level of
commitment, or both. This rather simplistic definition
foreshadows the superficial level of analysis apparent throughout
the book. The role of goals, for instance, is not addressed in
this definition. Limited capability and fear of escalation are
likewise omitted as factors that will narrow the scope of war.
Shavrov also reiterates the Soviet concepts of "just" war.
This, of course, is a precursor to explaining why Imperialist
wars are "unjust" and wars waged by the revolutionaries of social
justice are and will continue to be "just."
The book is an obvious propaganda work replete with the
often used phrases, historical analyses, and offerings to the
Party so common to Soviet literature. It sets up local war and
war in general as a last gasp attempt of the Imperialist to
maintain their system. He points to the USSR as the savior of
the Socialist camp, pointing out that since the Soviets achieved
their nuclear capability the Western nations have been much more
careful in their attempts to influence world events through
force. But beyond the obvious propaganda effort there seems to
be an attempt to justify some local wars and legitimize increased
military capability as a deterrent. Shavrov implicitly makes
these latter points through careful structuring of his arguments
and selective use of historical analogy.
Shavrov ' s structure examines local war in two contexts. The
first is under the principles of historicism. This is the
concept that local war is a movement from one historical stage to
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another. The second context paints local wars as "links in a
single chain of expansionist desires characterizing the strategy
of the struggle of Imperialism with the progressive forces of our
planet." This second context goes one step beyond the first by
not only stressing the inevitability of change towards Socialism,
but also the evil intentions of the Imperialist bloc to maintain
their own system at all costs. One of these costs, he asserts,
has been local wars.
Shavrov goes on to identify two major rationale for local
war. The first is a s a proving ground for Imperialist weapons
and methods. He cites numerous cases prior to WWI and WWII where
Western nations engaged in local wars to test new developments in
machine guns, tanks, etc.
The second rationale for Imperialist nations to resort to
local war is to gain a foothold against the inevitable tide of
Socialism. Revolutionary movements throughout the world have
been opposed by the reactionary forces in an attempt to stem the
tide of social progress. He paints local war as a last ditch
effort - politics by other means, to coin a phrase - to resist
change and perpetuate the capitalist system through force.
The author implicitly identifies several roles the USSR must
play to maintain its leadership of the Socialist bloc and prevail
in the great social struggle. The first of these is to preserve
Socialism by beating back the U.S. and its allies with the
Soviets own nuclear capability. Shavrov identifies the Soviet's
credible nuclear capability as a watershed in the Imperialists'
58
trend of resorting to local wars. It is interesting to note
that this book was written during the earlier stages of the
Soviet nuclear modernization program, during which virtually all
classes of missiles were upgraded.
The second role Shavrov identifies for the Soviet Union is
to aid revolutionary causes in their own "just" wars, including
support of national revolution. This is probably a move to
extinguish any questions that may have come up following the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, as well as justify prior
incursions of Soviet troops into other nations for the "just"
causes of preserving or encouraging social progress. Shavrov is
careful to point out that war is legitimate on the side of the
repressed party regardless of whether it is offensive or
defensive. This legitimizes such blatantly offensive actions as
Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.
These roles for the Soviet Union point out an interesting
paradox in the book. Shavrov takes great pains to deride the
West for its successful use of per projection. The U.S. Navy is
particularly highlighted in this role. But while he criticizes
the goals of this capability, he seems to be very impressed with
the means. This leaves the reader with the impression that he is
advocating a power projection capability for the Soviet Navy.
The fact that the Ivan Rogov and conventional carrier were being
built or deployed during this period no doubt reinforced this
impression in the west.
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All in all this was an interesting book with many lessons,
even though many of them have been overcome by events. It now
seems evident,, for instance, that the Soviets do not see a power
projection role for their navy in the near future. Also, the
concepts of interventionism, whether "just" or "unjust," have
taken a back seat to economic rebuilding in the political
leadership of the Soviet Union. I would not throw this book away
just yet, though. It contains much of the Marxist/Leninist
justification for power projection and intervening actions that
may be pursued later if Soviet economic problems are dealt with
and their leadership once again looks outward.
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ALWAYS PREPARED TO DEFEND THE FATHERLAND
by
N.V. Ogarkov
Reviewed by: JACQUELINE MAHER
"Always Prepared To Defend The Fatherland" was written by
Marshal Ogarkov, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, and signed
to press on 26 Jan 1982. The purpose of this book is to emphasize
and gain support for Marshal Ogarkov 's thesis of the "objective
necessity of further strengthening the defensive might of the
Soviet State." 1 Other themes addressed include the necessary
directions of organizational development of the Soviet Armed
Forces, methods to increase combat readiness, and several
significant problems with the development of Soviet Military Art. 2
There were 100,000 copies put to print, signifying an intended
large audience.
Marshal Ogarkov cites the increasing Imperialist threat, both
in general and specifically, as the need to increase the Soviet
defence capability. these threats include the desire on the part
of Imperialist circles (i.e. the United States and Europe) for
world supremacy, halting the world revolution, and ultimately
eradicating socialism. Specifically, he states that the United
States has not implemented arms agreements, halted talks,
1N.V. Ogarkov, Always Prepared To Defend The Fatherland . 1st
(JPRS 1/10412, 25 March 1982), p. 1.
2Ibid.
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intervened in domestic the affairs of foreign nations, and more
importantly, the United States has sought to redress the military
balance by starting an arms race that threatens to 1 e?.d to a third
world war. 3 To counter these threats, Marshal Ogarkov believes
that the Soviet Union must move beyond a purely defensive posture.
With this as his premise, Marshal Ogarkov makes a valid
argument for the reorganization and for the buildup of the Soviet
Armed Forces. Although the Soviet Union is by nature and practice
a peace loving nation, Ogarkov points to the beginning of the Great
Patriotic war as an example of the cost and the vulnerability of
maintaining a strictly defensive strategy. In order to prevent a
repetition of this and to prevent another world war, Ogarkov
promotes deterrence through strength.
The most important organizational development change proposed
by Ogarkov is the idea of groups of fronts vice single fronts. The
disadvantages of the single front approach were made apparent in
the Great Patriotic War. Upon completion of a front operation,
pauses would occur - sometimes quite lengthy, and frequent a
protracted period of preparation for the next front operation. Two
major deficiencies with this approach are the gross inefficient use
of time and the insufficient ability to achieve large scale
military-political objectives.
Both of these flaws are remedied by the groups of fronts
approach. This approach requires coordination and planning of
3Ibid., p. 4-5/
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several fronts operating simultaneously. "In the course of such
an operation each front can conduct two or more front operations
in succession,- with brief pauses, and even without pauses." 4 The
TVD, Theatre/Strategic Operation, is the embodiment of this concept
and is the principal form of military action today.
Ogarkov addresses several problems which plague the
development of Soviet Military Art and reflect his dissatisfaction
with present military conditions. The primary complaint deals with
the stagnation of views and the implementation of new systems.
Tied in with this problem is the view that weapons capabilities,
not doctrine or strategy, is most important when it comes to the
development of the art of warfare. 5 Another problem that exists is
the fact that modern weapons make surprise attacks possible,
demanding greater flexibility and efficiency of leadership by
commanders and their staffs. Other areas where there is room for
improvement include: the need for more and better rear services,
allocation of resources by services, branch and TVD, and finally,
the need to improve the training of officer cadres. 6
Marshal Ogarkov' s book "Always Prepared To Defend The
Fatherland" is a well written, incisive look at the defense needs
of the Soviet Union. During the time this book was written,





Marshal Ogarkov rejects the use of nuclear weapons and argues
successfully in favor of the development of conventional weapons
and forces. He correctly criticizes Soviet leadership because of
the lack of ability to change and grow with the times. However,
the one criticism of this book is that he does not even address
the question of political control over military decisions.
Ultimately Ogarkovis removed from office in 1984. Ironically,
Gorbachev comes to power in 1985 and embraces these very ideas,
which he continues today, thereby validating Ogarkov 's arguments.
This book is extremely informative and applicable to the situation
in the Soviet Union today. It is highly recommended to all
audiences.
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THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT
by
V.V. Zagladin
Reviewed by: RUTH M. ROSS
The fourth edition of The World Communist Movement , signed
to press on 17 April 1982, is the collective work of several
authors edited by Professor V. V. Zagladin, Chief of the
International Department of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party. What you would expect in this document is the
party line on the world communist movement. With few surprises,
that is what Zagladin delivers.
This comprehensive work describes the Marxist-Leninist
foundation of the world communist movement and examines in detail
all components of the movement, including the communist parties,
the revolutionary working class and its allies, and countries of
various levels of development involved in socialization.
Through the book, several themes emerge that seem to tie all
its elements together. The primary underlying theme is man's
inevitable revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism
and communism, realized through a course of tense class struggle.
This is the foundation belief of the world communist movement,
based on the teachings of Marxist-Leninism. Every aspect of the
book is tied together by this basic principle.]
A second theme prevalent in the book is the imperialist
threat to the social revolution. V. P. Iyerrusalimskiy , one of
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the authors, lists "weapons" in the imperialists 'arsenal against
the socialist movement. These include "attempts at military
pressure on world communism; ...an endeavor to rlaY on mistakes
and miscalcultions in socialist building; .. .use of international
trade as a means of political pressure; .. .the organization of
counterrevolutionary coups and intervention; and attempts to
undermine the unity of the world communist movement."
Another main theme is the communist movement as the
vanguard of the liberation struggle of the working class. The
communist movement, for example, is the only political force
operating in all detachments of the revolutionary process.
Another role of the party as the vanguard of the movement, is the
tremendous role in the process of revolutionary training of the
working class. It must educate the working classes so the people
2
can take power into their own hands under party guidance.
A final theme in the book was a caution message to the
communist parties, reminding them that their strength comes from
their constant fidelity to Marxist-Leninist principles.
"Experience has shown that every time the party has weakened and
departed from the Leninist organizational principles, whether it
be under the pretext of liberalizing or democratizing them, it
has ultimately lost influence and harmed the revolutionary




3process in the nation." Ye. V. Dobrotin, one of the authors,
stresses "unity in principle and diversity in particulars." 4 The
Marxist-Leninist basic principles must remain firm, but the
detail and the methods of the communist movement in a country
must be adjusted to the particular revolutionary situation.
How does this book fit into the context of its times? It
was written in 1982, perhaps the best of times for the world
communist movement. The book is optimistic, pointing out the
then recent revolutions in Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua;
the ouster of the monarchical regime in Iran; and movements
toward socialism in Grenada.
According to a 1987 RAND study, Soviet Political
Perspectives on Power Projection , the Soviets entered a new phase
5
of power projection in the early 1980' s. The World Communist
Movement was written before these changes were evident. One
chapter, however, did reflect changing times. The chapter on
"Communists and the Struggle for Peace" is updated significantly
from a chapter entitled "Development of the World Revolutionary
Process and Problems of War and Peace" in the 1973 edition of
this book. "Communists and the Struggle for Peace" addresses
3 Ibid., 398.
4 Ibio., 445.
Francis Fukayama, Scott Bruckner, and Sally Stoecker,
Soviet Political Perspectives on Power Projection (Santa Monica:
RAND, 1987), 32-36.




the effects of detente on the world communist movement. I.S.
Kremer, author of the chapter, explains that detente creates more
favorable conditions for the World revolutionary process. With
detente, socialist countries can direct more resources to the
movement, and the imperialists are not as likely to conduct
military intervention to counter the movement's actions.
Is this book relevant today? After the setbacks suffered by
socialist movements since this book was written, several
communist arguments for socialist revolution no longer seem
valid. Two specific points are economics and nationalism, with
socialism proclaimed as a solution to problems in both of these.
On economics, Ye. S. Ambartsumov stated, "Dynamic and stable
development of the socialist world is an important advantage over
the capitalist system," and on nationalism, he said, "It is true
that manifestatins of .. .nationalism do occur in the local areas
of some countries; but they are successfully overcome if the
ruling communist party remains true to the principles of
proletarian socialist internationalism and the Leninist policy of
7friendship among peoples." In areas of economics and
nationalism, the USSR has lost its credibility, not able to live
up to what it promises other countries.
In its time, however, the book fulfilled the expectations of
its audience. The fourth edition of a standard ideological
document, it described all aspects of the world communist
7Zagladin, The World Communist Movement . 63-64
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movement. Ninety-five thousand copies of this edition were
printed in Russian. Previous editions reportedly won the
recognition of. the Soviet public and were transited into foreign
languages.
This book is a political not military piece, and its wide
dissemination was designed for a political audience. It was
undoubtedly written for communist party members in the USSR who
are involved in the spread of world communism. In foreign
translations, it is a must-read book for the leaders of the many
international communist and workers' parties, whose
responsibility it is to bring about the socialist revolution.
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PROGRESS IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE USSR
by
M. M. Kir'yan
Reviewed by: ROBERT E. CLARK II
The improvement in weapons systems and the rise of
technology as an instrument of military improvement has over the
years yielded changes in Soviet Military Science and as an end
result the Socio-Political aspects of waging war. Lieutenant
General M. M. Kir'yan traces the rise of military technology from
the Soviet Civil War period until the early 1980' s and
incorporates it into various changes involving Soviet military
strategy. It is important to stress that technology affects
strategy and not doctrine which as Lt. General Kir'yan notes is
not a function of hardware but a framework that evolves from the
Communist party and Soviet state and is prioritized and dictated
by the Communist Party Of the Soviet Union (CPSU) . Along with the
evolution of military technology there are some important themes
in the book that reflect the military strategy of the time (the
late Brezhnev era) , such as "offensive defense" and "correlation
of forces", and give the reader insight into the Soviet military
mind as well as the Soviets use of available technology. Though
some themes discovered in the book are outdated or refuted by the
events of the past five years, the book allows the reader to
follow the thought and reasoning process of the Soviets that form
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military strategy. In a time when there is a lot of debate in the
Soviet Union concerning military strategy and defensive
sufficiency -it is imperative to understand the thought process
that is involved if one is to understand the results that emerge.
This book gives the reader such insight.
The book is written in a very chronological manner which
guides the reader through every detail of military technological
advances from the early 1900' s thru the early 1980' s. The Soviets
are constantly portrayed as survivors. Lt. General Kir'yan
illustrates throughout the book the Soviets ability to use what
resources are available to their maximum potential and prepare
for and win wars. The Soviets ability to use what resources are
they have to successfully prepare and fight a war is projected by
Lt. General Kir'yan into a hypothetical nuclear conflict in which
they emerge successful. The theme that nuclear war is winnable
was an important theme of the Brezhnev era as seen in the
development and employment of an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
system which conceded partial nuclear penetration. The idea of
winning a nuclear war, as well as nuclear war itself, has been
denounced by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and the present
day CPSU.
The most significant technological advances within the
Soviet Union as expressed by Lt. General Kir'yan was the advent
of aircraft (planes and missiles) and nuclear weapons. As a
result of their development Soviet military strategy was
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transformed in order to incorporate their capabilities. The
emergence of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) as the premier
military service is an example of the important placed on the
employment of nuclear missiles by the Soviets. Though the SRF is
at the pinnacle of the Soviet military hierarchy Lt. General
Kir'yan stressed the importance of force correlation with respect
to achieving a tactical goal. The correlation of forces versus
the concentration of forces was expressed as the key to conflict
success. Conflicts as well as wars were expected to be short
duration due to the power and speed of present day weapons and
weapons systems. Besides correlation of forces another theme that
was repeated in the book was the Soviets Strategy of an offensive
defense. Lt. General Kir'yan emphasized that defense consisted of
inflicting damage to an enemies nuclear and conventional forces
prior to those forces being employed against the Soviet Union.
Present day writings suggest that the Soviets may be adapting a
more conventional view of defense.
The book expresses the importance of proper targeting,
especially with respect to nuclear weapons. Lt. General Kir'yan's
discussion of avoiding economic areas in a nuclear exchange has
caused some analysts to suggest a possible Soviet reference to
M. Kir'yan, Progress In Military Technology And The Armed





2the feasibility of a limited nuclear war. There is no other
evidence, in fact the Soviets refute the possibility of a limited
nuclear war, in the literature to support this. I feel Lt.
General Kir'yan is talking purely in a sense of resource
conservation versus nuclear escalation, for nowhere is it
inferred that once a conflict goes nuclear it won't escalate.
Along with the Military Publishing House translation of the
book I also read the JPRS L/1108 translation (book excerpts)
dated 24 January 1983, and a review of the book by Ms. Sharon
Houy. I found no major differences in content between the two
translations. The major themes I have discussed in my review
were apparent in both translations. The review by Ms. Houy was
very accurate in its assessment of the major points that I feel
Lt. General Kir'yan was trying to express, but I feel she fell
short in her conclusion. Ms. Houy calls the book an "excellent
source on how Soviet military doctrine has changed to reflect new
capabilities brought about through technical progress." The fact
of the matter is that the book reflects changes in military
strategy as a result of technological advances, not changes in
doctrine. Lt. General Kir'yan makes it clear in the introduction
that doctrine is an output of CPSU policy and then evolves
military strategy throughout the book as a function of technology
in the bounds of military doctrine as dictated by the CPSU.
2 . ...Edward Warner, "Soviet Concepts And Capabilities For
Limited Nuclear War," Rand Note , Prepared for the USAF, Santa
Monica, Ca. Feb. 1989.
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Though the Soviet Union is in a dynamic state and many of
the central themes of the book may have changed, or been refuted,
the book is still invaluable in that it gives you ? -i insight into
how the higher level Soviet mind thinks. The Soviet's do not
think like westerners and it is imperative if we are to logically
assess the changes, that are occurring and what they may mean,
that we do so from a Soviet perspective.
74
MARXIST-LENINIST TEACHING
ON WAR AND THE ARMY
by
D.A. VOLKOGONOV, Ed.
Reviewed by: MARVIN KNORR, JR.
The book, Marxist-Leninist Teaching on War and The Army, is
a good view of Soviet thinking prior to Gorbachev. It is an update
of the 1972 version edited by the same officer and makes partial
use of materials from the book "war and the Army" published in
1977. There were 16 collective "authors who range in rank from
colonel to lieutenant general.
The book is arduous to read. Part of the difficulty is the
premise that all the problems of the world are caused by
capitalism. The world can only be made better through Communism,
which will provide a pure, benign environment in which the workers
of the world can unite.
The book, on the other hand, provides valuable understanding
into Soviet Military Doctrie. The object of the study is the
military-political practice of classes and states. Because of it's
complexity, it cannot be embraced by a single science. The
principle ones are:
1. Military-special approach/technological approach —
their objective is to eveal the specific laws governing
the preparations made by states and armed forces for war.




This is the only one that the bourgeois military science
is capable of understanding.
2. Philosophical-socological/class-political — their
immediate object is to reveal the social nature and social
significance of military-political practice from the
positions of a particular class.
Ironically, the Soviet meaning of peace make quite clear
their views of the capitalism with the following definitions:
"Communists openly declare that their goals may be attai
onlv bv the overthrow of the capitalist structure."
"Only the triumph of scialism throughout the world will
finally exclude the causes of war from the life of human
society.
"
As shown above, it is important to understand Soviet
meanings or definitions becuse they may differ from our
definitions or ways of thinking and have a unique twist to them.
The authors examine the economic, social, spiritual,
scientific, military and political factors as they relate to the
total make up of the potential military power of the whole state.
They sum up the military poential of war as follows:
"Being a continuation of policy by violent means,
war is not only a collision between armed forces but also
a struggle in politics, economics and ideology. An armed
struggle is the decisive characteristic of war, it is its
unique feature; however, war is not limited to it alone."
They go on to explain the following ideas: (1) The
Principles of Classification of Wars (2) The Four Main Types of








Of particular interest is the authors' definition of Military
Science as the boundary between the social, natural and technical
branches of -- scientific knowledge. The concept of Military
Science possesses a General Theory and is composed of the theory
of the Art of War, which is the core of Military Science; and, ow
the Art of War is made up of the Theory of Strategy, of
Operational Art, and of Tactics. Soviet Military Science is so
cultivated that is has to predict the military-technical nature
of a possible war; its scale and the methods of combat
activities. Military History plays such an important role in
Military Science that is study is the sole purpose of linking
together the laws governing the Development of the Art of War and
the Development of the Armed Forces and Military Training.
The authors talk minimally about nuclear war and say nuclear
missile war deeply influences the possibility of both its
ccurrence and its prevention. The authors, near the end of
Chapter Two, conclude with the following statement:
"The Soviet Union and its armed forces have no recourse
other than to be in constant readiness to decisively
repel the aggressor, using all forms of modern weapons at
their disposal, including nuclear. Use of nuclear weapons
in response to their use by an aggressor does not diminish
the justice of the war fought by the state opposing the
aggressor.
"
The undertones of the book lead one to believe that the Soviets




The book was reviewed by an outside source, Soviet Colonel
V. T. Login. His conclusions state the book contains three main
parts: (1) war and its historical fate (2) the nnny and society,
3) and the factors of war and military organizational
development. He indicates the book has been substantially
reworked from the original.
It is interesting to see in this book as well as other
Soviet writings the Marxist's outlook on the origin, causes and
ssence of wars. The reviewer, Col. Login, summed it up:
With the appearance of an antagonistic class society,
its permanent accomplice, war, arose . . . the source of
war, its genesis resides in the very exploiting system
based up on private ownership of the means of
production and the suppression of the workers."
Col. Login was disappointed that the authors did not analyze
the Anglo-Argentine conflict in 1982 as an example of modern
imperialist war and show the aggressive role of U.S. imperialism
n it. Of great interest, as Col. Login explains, is the chapter
devoted to an analysis of historical wars for the defense of the
socialist fatherland, as a particular type of just war. Stating:
"The theses and conclusions of the chapter are of great
importance in understanding the measures being taken by
the CPSU, the Soviet government and the socialist nations
to defend the victories of socialism under conditions
where the imperialists have proclaimed a "crusade"
against the USSR and the other socialist countries. A
knowledge of these wars make it possible to predict the
development of military events, to correctly assess the
nature of the wars being prepared by the imperialists,
the methods of their initiation and conduct to correctly
organize the training of the troops and naval forces to
repel possible aggression."
6Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No. 8, Aug.
85, pp. 85-87 — JPRS-UMA-86-003 14 JAN. 86.
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He concludes his review saying:
"The book makes a substantial contribution to a
further elaboration of Marxist-Leninist teachings
concerning war and the army and will be a useful aid
for officers, officer candidates and students in the
higher military schools in increasing their






Reviewed by: ALLAN C. POLLEY
M.V. Frunze, Military Theorist concerns the life and work of
one of the most prominent early figures of the Communist party and
Soviet state. Because of his efforts in the development of Soviet
military theory, and because of his devoted leadership, Frunze is
known as the "Father of the Red Army." Col. Gen. Gareev,
significantly writing as one of the powerful deputy chiefs of the
Soviet General Staff, provides an analysis of the military
theoretical heritage of Frunze from a modern perspective. As such,
this book provides insight into current Soviet military thinking.
This current perspective is best illustrated by a passage that
Western analysts should commit to memory. On pages 94-95
(Pergamon-Brassey ' s ed.) , Gareev repudiates the notion that nuclear
weapons have changed the nature of war, flatly stating that war
remains a continuation of politics by violent means. Regardless
of the weapons used, war will always remain essentially a class
struggle. Gareev continues by saying that although the Soviets
favor excluding war from the world and feel that nuclear war is
inadmissible, they nevertheless must be prepared for a retaliatory
nuclear strike in the event the imperialists launch a nuclear
attack. Despite the catastrophic consequences of this action, to
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do otherwise would represent a capitulation to the forces of
aggression.
By providing the reader with the historic?"1 background of
Frunze's childhood, early development, military successes,
organization and training of the armed forces, and establishment
of the Soviet defense industry, Gareev shows Frunze to be a serious
student of military history, military theory and military affairs,
always striving to analyze the past, identify strengths and
weaknesses and push military theory forward. His concern was not
where military theory had been, but where it should go. While
Frunze's studiousness, it is continually stressed that his devotion
to, and correct application of, Marxist-Leninist teachings is what
enabled him to think so clearly, allowing him to understand
Clausewitz's limitations and build on what was rational. In this
manner, Gareev illustrates that Marxist-Leninist theory is as valid
today as it was in Frunze's time. Gareev also points out that
today's officers must continue the work by acquiring military
knowledge and the creative analysis of it. (pg. 331) Frunze's
efforts are to serve as an example.
Another important theme is that Frunze understood that the
revolution could not be won by solely military means, but
recognized that war is composed of armed, economic, ideological
and diplomatic struggles. Simply defeating the enemy on the
battlefield was not a guarantee of political victory. The enemy
must be defeated in all four areas. A professional soldier must
therefore devote himself not only to the armed struggle, but to an
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understanding of all four struggles. Frunze addressed the economic
struggle by devoting effort to the fledgling Soviet defense
industry. Frunze believed that preparation for war must extend to
all levels of society and involves full mobilization of the state.
Again, this applies Marxist-Leninist doctrine to the military on
all levels. Political and military-technological considerations
should be organically fused, as they form the two parts of military
doctrine (pg. 104) . Frunze recognized that the organization of
armies and the methods employed by them for the conduct of battle
were dependent upon material, or economic, conditions.
In another theme, Gareev shows that Frunze's advocation of
the offensive, and the success he had with it as a military
commander when faced with poor odds, led to his development of the
Unitary Military Doctrine, in which an army should be trained
throughout in a spirit of offensiveness, united by ideology. When
Gareev wrote this book (1984) this attitude still prevailed as he
wrote that in the nuclear age, the initial period of the war is
likely to be "the main and decisive period which largely
predetermines the outcome of the entire war" (pg. 214). This
statement, which seems to imply that a first strike could be
considered, almost immediately follows statements that Soviet
policy opposes any use of nuclear weapons (but would use them to
retaliate against a nuclear attack) , that Soviet policy is not to
be the first to employ nuclear weapons, and that Soviet military
policy is strictly defensive in nature. It is well to note that
Gareev points out that of 210 Front operations in the Great
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Patriotic War, 160 were defensive. Thus the Soviets can be
expected to employ the offensive in the defense.
Gareev's work provides the reader of Sokolov"kiy * s Military
Strategy with a revised outlook on the Soviet perspective of
nuclear war. While he feels that Sokolovskiy was "generally
correct," he feels that the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and
the West's improved conventional weapons have again altered the
likely form of war, making it necessary to prepare for a protracted
war.
This book was probably intended to stimulate military thought
among Soviet military officers. It should do the same among U.S.
military officers. Frunze's effort at divining military theory is
an example to anyone who considers themself a military
professional. His depth of devotion, if truly depicted in this
book, can be considered legendary. Frunze forms the wellspring
from which Soviet military theory bursts. Clausewitz, the
military theorist most likely to have been studied by U.S.
officers, is viewed by the Soviets as limited by bourgeois bias.
This means that an understanding of Marxist-Leninist ideology is
essential to understanding the Soviet world view and their policies
and strategies.
This book is somewhat repetitive, which serves to highlight
the important portions. It is also relatively easy to read,
compared to other Soviet writings. I recommend it as much for
what if tells us about the Soviets, as for what it can teach us
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about military affairs in general. Frunze was a Communist, but





Reviewed by: STEPHEN P. BLACK
Written in 1985. History Teaches Vigilance marked the
return of Marshal Nikolav Ogarkov following his dismissal, in
1984, from his position as First Deputy Minister of Defense and
Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. This work
followed his 1982 effort entitled Always Ready to Defend the
Fatherland in which Ogarkov categorically denied that there was
any room for compromise or cooperation with the United States.
"Active defense" and the ability to launch a "devastating
counterattack in any situation and under any condition" were the
cornerstones of his strategic thesis. This hard-line stance,
however, was out of step with the political agenda of the then
Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko. Chernenko desired a more
"flexible" view of relations with the United States in order to
resume arms limitations talks. This desire has been advanced
significantly by Chernenko 's successor Mikhail Gorbachev as part
of his ongoing policies of perestroika and qlasnost . History
Teaches Vigilance then was viewed as a tempered, more flexible
view on Soviet strategic thought vis-a-vis the United States.
Published by the Soviet Defense Ministry and receiving a
"most commendable review," Ogarkov ' s book was praised on the
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merits of his last two chapters, a "Conclusion" and the
preceding, "War Should Be Prevented." In these chapters Ogarkov
concluded that the threat of war still exist" but can be
"neutralized." In a reversal of his previous stance he claimed
that cooperation between states of various social systems is
"desirable," "necessary" and "possible." As optimistic as this
sounds, these conclusions cannot escape the sheer weight of the
first five chapters in which Ogarkov lays down in no uncertain
terms that the main source of danger in the world today is
imperialism, as personified by the "nuclear insanity of (the)
imperialist hawks" in the United States and their "open
aspirations. .. toward world domination." In this respect,
Ogarkov' s "tempered" stance and "meritorious" final chapters
appear as an unwanted appendage to his true beliefs which
dominate the book; namely, that the Soviet Union needs an "active
defense" and an urgent concentration of effort to improve
economic and technological support for a modern Soviet Armed
Forces.
Written for "wide readership," History Teaches Vigilance is
steeped in ideological conviction without getting lost in the
pretentious cerebral gymnastics of Marxist-Leninist dialectics
that are so painful to casual Western readers. This does not
mean that Ogarkov abandons an emphasis on dialectics. On the
contrary, he discusses them at length, but it is a discussion
that is concise and well clarified by historical example. His
chapter, "Based on Scientific Laws" for example is an in-depth
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discussion of military science in which he lays down the Marxist-
Leninists conclusion that military science is decidedly
influenced by.^a nation's level of production. tThat follows is
concise review of the three main components of Marxist-Leninist
dialectic materialism: the contradiction between offensive and
defensive systems; the denial of the negative and; the
qualitative/quantitative aspects of combat equipment. Ogarkov's
use of history to explain these theoretical concepts in concrete
terms goes a long way in clarifying both the concepts themselves
and the Soviet reliance on theoretical thinking.
Ogarkov's use of history, however, is not always focused and
objectively analytical. Most of History Teaches Vigilance
examines the broad scope of history primarily, but not
exclusively, from 1917 to the present. The scope includes not
only what Soviet history has taught them about defense but also
how American history reinforces Marxist-Leninist thought
concerning imperialism. Ogarkov's treatment of history,
therefore, is not fully analytical and is certainly not detailed.
Rather, it represents the leap of faith that the Marxist-
Leninist, dialectic materialistic understanding of history
(including Lenin's plagiarism of Clausewitz) has offered the only
true reading of history. This is of little significance for
Ogarkov is not a historian but a propagandist in search of policy
support.
The first chapter, "The Source of War: an Exploitive Social
Order," is a thin historical look at class struggle from
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feudalism to the nuclear age. The conclusion drawn, not
surprisingly is that the true source of conflict down through the
ages has been class exploitation; an historical condition
currently reflected most acutely by the imperialistic West and
the United States in particular. It follows then that "war is
the perpetual and inevitable companion of imperialism." In this
context, Ogarkov reiterates Soviet philosophy concerning just
(defense of socialism) and unjust (imperialistic) wars and points
to the logical conclusion that the way to eliminate war is to
eliminate imperialism (though he does not specifically state
this)
.
All of this serves as a precursor to the themes that run
throughout the book concerning U.S. policy and doctrine.
Ogarkov ' s xenophobic, ideological and cursory reading of U.S.
history "proves" that "White House" doctrine is "malicious
...adventurous" and "expansionist." Furthermore, American delays
in entering both World Wars are indications that U.S. doctrine is
to profit from war and then to move in and dictate to an
exhausted enemy." Fortunately the "success of socialism" and the
"contradictions of capitalism" have been able to check U.S.
designs. But this has only been met with renewed U.S.
aggression, exemplified by its various postwar strategies of
massive retaliation, flexible response, deterrence and Reagan's
"Direct Conflict;" of which were directed at the Soviet Union in
order to circumvent their improving defensive achievements,
including the nuclear parity achieved in the 1960s.
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In contrast, the USSR has been the "standard bearer of
peace." Brest-Litovsk and Soviet efforts in collective security
from the 1920s to the present clearly dedicate this.
Imperialism, however, has thwarted such attempts. The Nazi-
Soviet Pact of 1939 was an expedient for a Soviet government
frustrated by western appeasement of Hitler and the resultant
isolation of the Soviet Union. And for those who might have
designs against the Soviet Union, Ogarkov points out that the
Second World War "demonstrates that no force can shatter
socialism or bring the USSR to its knees."
In this context Ogarkov sets down his fourth chapter, "Two
Doctrines, Two Strategies," which compares U.S. and Soviet
military doctrines. His treatment of U.S. doctrine is a rehash
of his earlier xenophobic views, but his real expertise, and the
true value of this book, lie in his elucidation on the form and
content of Soviet doctrine. Ogarkov explicitly defines and lies
out in their proper hierarchical structure, the concepts of
Soviet military doctrine with both its socio-political and
military-technical aspects) , military art and military strategy.
In doing so he clarifies the context and structure of Soviet
military thought and provides insight into the Soviet views on
the character of war and requirements for its conduct.
Soviet military doctrine, states Ogarkov, is a "Doctrine of
Protection for Peace and Socialism." Soviet military art in this
respect, concerns the means and forms of combat actions required
to achieve this, which in turn leads to a military strategy that
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is "defensive in nature." This defense requires, according to
Ogarkov, an ability "to repel sudden attack and strike back with
a powerful strike." It is a defense that v*r./s to repel an
aggressor under any condition or circumstance and never to "be
taken by surprise." It views the character of war as expansive,
covering "huge territories . . . all continents and oceans" and
"most countries." Limited war is rejected as "it will be
practically impossible to restrain nuclear war within certain
limits. Soviet counteractions to an imperialist attack are seen
to be maneuvering, dynamic and extremely destructive, continuing
"until complete victory over the enemy."
THough five years have passed and much significant change
has occurred, Ogarkov' s views on defense lie at the center of the
debate in the West and the Soviet Union concerning the direction
of Soviet force structures and doctrine adjustments under
perestroika. The question remains whether Soviet security is
best served by a truly "defensive-defense" or the more active
"defensive-counterattack" posture that Ogarkov favors.
One of Ogarkov ' s themes, however, seems to have been fully
embraced particularly by Gorbachev. This involves the contention
that the Soviet economy must be improved in order to enable it to
"successfully solve the most complex technological defense
problems and to create any kind of weapon" which may be necessary
to "defend the Homeland."
In his conclusions, Ogarkov has picked up on the CPSU
Central Committee's party line that "one must fight against war
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before it breaks out," and promote mutual cooperation in order to
"prevent the nuclear fire (and) protect life on the planet."
Such statements by a Soviet Marshal are of crucial significance.
But it seems that these conclusions carry the full weight of his
authority and not that of his convictions. Mutual cooperation
and "defensive-defense" are questionable because history has
taught him otherwise.
History Teaches Vigilance is a short work but it is rich in
insights for the reader. I would recommend this book for a
number of reasons. Ogarkov's treatment of history is broad and
not rich in detail but it provides an outstanding overview of the
Soviet interpretation of history, particularly U.S. history. On
the theoretical level, Ogarkov's discussion of Soviet military
doctrine, art and strategy is concise, authoritative and well
written. Additionally, Ogarkov's position on "active defense"
and the need for technological improvements represents one of the
major "schools of thought" concerning the future of the Soviet
Armed Forces. For these reasons and the fact that Ogarkov's
writings carry the authority of a Marshal of the Soviet Union,




V. G. Reznichenko, Ed., et. al.
Reviewed by: KENNETH L. KNOTTS, JR.
The 1987 edition of Tactics is the third version of a work
which was originally published in 1966. This book, one of a series
called the "Officer's Library," was nominated in 1968 for the
Frunze Prize, an annual award presented for "excellent military or
military historical works." 1 A 1984 revision of Tactics was
translated into English and published in the U.S. in 1987 by the
U.S. Air Force as Volume 21 of its Soviet Military Thought Series.
A second revision, published by the Soviets in 1987, was translated
by the U.S. Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) in June
1988. This JPRS translation will be the primary focus of my
analysis, although I will also point out some of the more
significant differences between the two most recent versions. In
may analysis, I also used as a reference a pamphlet published by
the Air Force in 1988 which contrasts the 1984 and 1987 editions. 2
I was unable to locate a translation of the 1966 edition.
Tactics was edited by a collective of three authors: Vasiliy
G. Reznichenko, Ivan N. Vorobyev, and Nikolay F. Miroshnichenko.
William F. Scott, Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and
Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1975): 2.
2Tactics: The Second (1987) Edition Compared With the 1984
Edition . Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force Directorate of Research
and Soviet Studies, 1988.
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According to Dr. Bill Scott, these men are all on the staff of the
Frunze Military Academy. 3 At least one of them, Reznichenko, is a
retired General-Major. A direct statement of sponsorship by a
higher-ranking, active-duty officer would probably have indicated
even higher military approval of Tactics . However, the status of
Reznichenko as a retired General-Major and the position of all the
authors on the staff of the prestigious Frunze Academy, in my
opinion, combine to reflect the relative importance of this book.
Tactics is directed toward the professional education of
Soviet military officers, reserve officers and students in military
educational institutions. Its publication in 100,000 copies shows
that the book was intended for a fairly wide distribution. This
work is not intended as an exhaustive study of all tactical
problems, but instead is meant by the authors to be used in
conjunction with Soviet Armed Forces field manuals, which contain
the most important rules of tactical combat operations. The
authors feel, however, that a more comprehensive understanding of
in-depth problems is required to fully master the modern theory of
tactics. With this goal in mind, they have sought to help officers
"...master tactical art in the course of independent study as one
of their objectives" (p. 1)
.
As might be surmised from its title, the book addresses almost
exclusively the third level of Soviet military art, the tactical
level. Tactics examines the complicated dynamics of tactical-level
3William F. Scott, Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and
Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1975): 34.
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units on the modern battlefield. Following a historical background
on the development of tactics—with particular emphasis placed upon
the contributions of experiences in the Great Patriotic War and the
implications of recent "revolutions in military affairs"—the
authors describe the important relations of armaments and
technology, along with the various forms of combined-arms battle.
The subject of "tactics" is important enough to merit a two-page
article in the Military Encyclopedia Dictionary . (On a related
note, a careful word-for-word comparison of the 1983 and 1986
versions of the entry for "tactics" revealed only minor changes
which do not reflect any substantive alternations in the definition
of the term) . The subject matter presented in Tactics covers all
aspects addressed in the encyclopedia article, but in much greater
detail in a markedly different format.
Although the theme of combined-arms combat is prevalent
throughout every section of the book, the work concentrates almost
solely on ground operations. Naval units are mentioned in some
detail (some 2-3 pages) only in the context of transporting troops
via sealift and in connection with the fire support of ground
troops in maritime sectors. I found only three other references
to naval units; these are only brief citations regarding readiness
and discipline of supporting forces. The two areas of greatest
emphasis in the 1987 edition are the sections on offensive and
defensive battle. Two sections of somewhat lesser emphasis, but
still given considerable attention, are the chapters on troop
movement and disposition of troops in field. The increasingly
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vital role played by the tactical-level commander in combat is also
repeatedly stressed. According to the authors, the conditions of
contemporary-war—especially the ever more complic_tid technology
and the time compression dictated by faster reaction times—only
intensify the pressures placed upon the junior commander and demand
from him greater knowledge and initiative. Tactics contains
detailed descriptions of many scenarios which will help a commander
prepare for combat. In short, this book was very aptly described
by Major Milton Nielson of the U.S. Air Force Academy's History
Department as a "'cookbook' for the conduct of war." 4
Of particular interest are the differences in the contents of
the 1984 and 1987 editions. The 1987 edition is almost twice the
length of the 1984 issue (496 pages versus 270, respectively).
While the 1984 version does not ignore the role of emerging
technologies, the latest edition features a greatly expanded
coverage of the following topics: nuclear weapons, precision-
guided munitions (PGMs) , helicopters, automation of troop control,
electronic warfare and NATO's Airland Battle. Three entirely new
chapters— "Troop Control," "Comprehensive Support of the
Engagement," and "Troop Disposition in the Field"—were added to
the 1987 edition. These new sections pay particular attention to
the preparation of emplacements to protect troops from PGMs and
4Major Milton C. Nielson, USAF, Instructor of History at the
U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado. The major's book review of
Tactics appeared in Air Power Journal , (Spring 1988): 80-81.
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"weapons of mass destruction." Also notable is the fact that 4
pages were added to the chapter on "Defensive Battle."
The additions to the 1987 version reflect - growing Soviet
concern over NATO's improved conventional munitions and an expanded
interest in the role of defense in combat. The latter emphasis is
likely the result of the Warsaw Pact's declaration, in May 1987,
of its new "defensive doctrine." This factor, along with the
strong impact of Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" on military
affairs since March 1985, I believe explains why the Soviets so
drastically revised the 1984 edition of Tactics only three years
later. However, the implications of the new doctrine clearly had
not filtered down to the tactical level at the time of publication;
despite a greater stress on the role of defense, the chapter
devoted to that topic still focuses mainly on the defensive as a
vehicle for a transition to a decisive offensive. Reflecting the
continuing dispute over the roles of the offensive and defensive
within the Soviet military, the authors state unequivocally that,
"Offense is the principal form of battle" (p. 22)
.
To all but the most patient readers, this book will seem very
tedious. It is, however, intended to be very comprehensive in
order to encompass lessons learned in a wide variety of tactical
situations, as viewed against a background of Soviet military
experience. The book, although difficult to read, provides
valuable insights into how the Soviet tactical commander will
conduct business in future conflicts. As such, Tactics is an
invaluable reference for information on Soviet tactical forces.
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A working knowledge of its contents is an absolute must for anyone
who wishes to understand Soviet tactical command and control.
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THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE CPSU
by
V. F. Khalipov
Reviewed by: THOMAS A. FRIES
The Military Policy of the CPSU (Communist Party of the
Soviet Union) was signed to press on 5 November 1987. The
author, Vyacheslev Filippoviich Khalipov, is a Doctor of
Philosophical Sciences. I could find no further information on
the author nor was I able to find a review of the book. The book
had a publication run of 30,000 copies (not particularly large),
and was "meant for officers, for the party and Komsomol activ of
the Armed Forces, and for everyone interested in questions of
CPSU military policy."
The book is important in that it was, at the time of its
publication, the most formalized statement of CPSU military
policy since the Soviet adoption of the policies of "defensive
defense" (as opposed to the traditional Soviet military doctrine
of "offensive defense) and "reasonable sufficiency." Coming at
the end of 1987, the book is published after the 27th CPSU Party
Congress of 1987 which is widely viewed as the Party Congress
where General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev pressed for and
received the adoption of his reform policies (both domestic and
foreign) by the CPSU leadership. The book therefore reflects the
dominant themes of the Party congress.
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Reflecting the "new" defensive doctrine, the book holds
that the "highest goal of CPSU military policy is to prevent war
and ensure a reliable defense of socialism achievements, the
Soviet people's peaceful labor, and the state's sovereignty and
territorial integrity." While the book is generally defensive in
tone, there are some contradictory statements that lead one to
believe that, at the time of publication, the debate over just
what "defensive defense" and "reasonable sufficiency" mean has
not been definitively settled. For instance, the book points out
that the world has changed, that military force is no longer a
viable method for states to resolve disputes, and that the policy
of "new thinking," "reasonable sufficiency" and a requirement for
economic growth has necessitated a reduction in Soviet military
spending. Yet the book also notes the "growing military threat"
requires that the CPSU spare no effort in equipping the Armed
Forces with what is needed. The contradiction is that one does
not normally reduce defense spending in the face of an increased
military threat.
The book is notable in that it does reject some themes,
which in the past, have been common themes of military writings.
Chief among these is the rejection of "world war" as a
continuation of politics by other means. Also while not
explicitly rejected, there is no mention of providing support to
I do not intend to be sarcastic nor do I intend to convey
the idea that I do not believe any Soviet pronouncements, but he
Soviets have claimed that their military doctrine was defensive
since Brezhnev's Tula speech of 1977.
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national liberation movements.
One of the more interesting themes I found in the book was
the oft repeated theme of the Party as the final arbiter of
defense policy. While this is nothing new and has indeed always
been accepted by the military (at least the socio-political side
of military doctrine) , the book goes to great length to point out
that it is because of the party's leadership that the country has
attained strategic parity. Also repeated on several occasions is
the claim that the Party has provided and will continue to
provide all that is needed for the Armed Forces to accomplish
their missions. The interference here is that military grumbling
about reduced defense spending as possibly indicative of the
Party's commitment to the defense of the motherland is
unwarranted.
Some western analysts have pointed out hat perestroika is
intended to benefit Soviet military industry as well as the
civilian economy. The Military Policy of the CPSU makes no
secret of the matter pointing out that "the accomplishments of
such essential management tasks will contribute. .. also to an
improvement in the defense industry proper. The theme of the
need to improve the national economy is often repeated.
Overall, the book is worth reading because, for its time, it
is noticeably free of the polemics about the threat from the west
and it does make some statements that, prior to this, had not
been seen on this subject. But still, the overall impression I
got from this book is that the debate (as of late 1987) is not
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over yet. As I mentioned earlier, while it is generally
defensive in tone one could pick out bits of information to
support both- sides of the argument over whether Soviet military
policy has indeed changed. (The author of the review personally
feels it has as a result of several factors.) With the 28th
Party Congress scheduled for this summer, another book on this
subject should be published soon afterwards. Perhaps the author
will be more authoritative (my assumption is Khalipov is not) and








V.V. Shelyag, Ed., et. al.
Reviewed by: DEENA R. SOSTROM
This book went to the presses in 1972 as part of the Soldier's
Bookshelf series. 150,000 copies were printed. This work is not
to be confused with a book of the same name published in 1967. The
stated audiences for this work are officer candidates and students
of higher Military-political schools.
Military psychology is a specialized branch of psychology that
"studies the patterns in the mental activities of people and
collectives under the conditions of military activities (service,
combat, political-moral and psychological preparation for combat)
and combat." The authors seem to feel that this work is a "how-
to" book:
Military psychology must provide sound and
specific recommendations on elaborating the
effective ways, means, and methods for educating
personnel. It must provide recommendations on
seeking out ways for reducing the time reguired
to bring troops to a state of high combat
readiness, as well as for further improving and
perfecting the style of work of military personnel
and the scientific organization of military labor.
1V.V. Shelyag, A.D. Glotchkin, andK.K. Platonov, Ed., Military








The amount of how to type information is limited and general in
nature. They also stated that they have relied on research data
in this fields If this is so the research is r.ot presented or
seemingly footnoted. What is presented is a primer in Soviet
psychology and its relationship to military psychology. As a
primer it is a very good text. Each chapter opens by defining the
concepts covered and then proceeds to give the importance of these
concepts to psychology and military psychology in particular.
A major theme is the centrality of dialectical materialism.
Without this basis psychology can not be scientific or do more than
hint at the truth. It is stated that to not have this as its basis
will allow psychology to be vulgarized and used as a weapon by the
imperialist against the USSR and to prop up their own decaying
structures
.
Another theme is the importance of military psychology:
The USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A.
Grechko, had stressed: "In order to correctly organize the process
of training and education, officers should not only be well trained
in a political and military-technical sense, but also possess
completely concrete and firm knowledge in the area of pedagogics
4
and psychology."
In carrying out the designated tasks, military psychology









effectively control the men and collectives, and to form military
teamwork, solidarity, discipline, and other features which
5
characterize a military collective.
A third theme is that with proper military training which
includes the use of military psychology that soldiers can be
trained and prepared for all forms of war. This includes nuclear
war:
It can be expected that the modern battlefield will be
saturated by terrifying phenomena which are unexpected for the men.
These include: nuclear explosions, light radiation, the
radioactive contamination of the terrain, and fires from napalm
weapons. In order that the tension and danger of modern combat
not cause a panic and other negative responses, even in peacetime
the soldier should be prepared for accepting a nuclear missile war
and combat, as well as for correct actions in this situation. . .
comprise an urgent military psychological problem deriving from the
7theses of Soviet military science.
A theme that reoccurred throughout was the role of the
collective and the need to develop the collectives psychology. One
instance showing the importance of the collective was illustrated
"During the years of the Great Patriotic War, our soldiers often










Fear and manifestation of cowardice in one soldier are overcome by
Q
the high fighting spirit of the entire collective.
The role of labor was repeatedly brought c~c. Labor was
stressed as necessary for the evolution of mankind from animal "In
his classic work ' The role of Labor in the Transition of Ape to
Man . ' R. Engles showed that labor is 'the first basic condition of
human life, and to such a degree that, in a certain sense, we
9
should say: labor created man himself.'"
As a psychology text, on the whole, it is not bad but is more
detailed than most people would appreciate. The theories are
interesting especially in that they do come from a non standard
theoretical base for Americans and it might be interesting to see
how much can be corroborated using western scientific methods. As
for a general military reader the chapters in part one,
particularly chapter 3, and those dealing with combat and military
units (chapter 12.3, chapters 25-29) would be the most interesting
and salient. I was never able to determine how much of the
distortion in the Soviet view of bourgeois psychology (chapter 3)
was because they were attempting to force a Soviet style framework
on a western (predominantly US) style work, how much was due to the
difference in theory, and how much was purposeful distortion for
propaganda. This book is a context builder for Soviet soldiers and









Forecasting In Military Affairs
A Soviet View
by
Yu. V. Chuyev and Yu. B. Mikhaylov
Reviewed by: KENNETH J. JOHNS
Chuyev' s 1975 work, Forecasting in Military Affairs , is both
troubling and encouraging. Troubling, because if highlights some
of our own deficiencies, and encouraging, because if validates
what we think we do right.
The book was published in the~U.S. as the 16th volume in the
"Soviet Military Thought" series, under the auspices of the U.S.
Air Force. The Soviet edition, which consisted of 12,000 copies,
was published by the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of
Defense, for members of the military, industry, and related
academic fields.
Chuyev, who is an accomplished academic, and author of
several important works in related fields, undertakes two
primary tasks in writing the present volume. First, he attempts
to outline the general principles of forecasting, or predictive
systems, describing their constituent components, their various
For example, Krylatyye rakety [Cruise Missiles] , Moscow:
Voyenizdat, 1964; Isseledovaniye operatsiy v voyennom dele
[Operations Research in Military Affairs], Moscow: Voyenizdat,
197 0; and Proqnozirovaniye kolichestvennykh kharakteristik
protsessov [Forecasting Quantitative Characteristics of
Processes], Moscow: "Sov. Radio," 1975.
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types, and the functions that they perform in solving various
military problems. Secondly, he examines the three basic classes
of forecasting systems—heuristic, mathematical, and composite
—
and outlines what he views as the relative strengths and
shortcomings of each type with respect to specific areas of
military problem-solving and decision-making. After a lengthy
and somewhat tedious analysis, Chuyev arrives at the conclusion
that in most military situations, the decision-maker's
requirements are best fulfilled by employing a system which
combines both heuristic (relying on expert opinion) and
mathematical forecasting.
A third, yet unstated aim of Chuyev' s is to demonstrate the
increasing importance of military forecasting in the world of
highly sophisticated weaponry, and a rapidly changing
battlefield. He addresses himself here to his colleagues in the
Ministry of Defense, and his patrons in the Politburo. By citing
no less than a dozen times that military forecasting is an
"independent branch of military-scientific research," Chuyev
appears to petition for an augmented role and additional rubles
for his branch. With ground forces preeminent in the Soviet
military, and with emphasis on ICBMs, it's likely that Chuyev and
his breed fought heated budget battles to justify expenditures on
such mundane things as automated control systems and computers.
To the U.S. military reader, the benefits of this work are
reaped long before Chuyev reaches his rather unrevealing
conclusion. It is by understanding how Soviet military
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commanders and political leaders view the decision-making
process, and how they see the basic nature of the variables in
that process, and how they see the basic nature 01 the variables
in that process, that we as potential adversaries, can learn from
this book. Chuyev provides important, though unintended insights
in this respect.
First, scientific forecasting, in the military or any other
field, is firmly rooted in the teachings of Marx and Lenin.
According to the principles of dialectical and historical
materialism, and the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, all
things are knowable. "Not only is knowledge of the past and
present possible, but knowledge of the past and present possible,
but knowledge of the future as well, since in principle there are
no unknowable things,... bit only things... that are not yet
2 •
comprehended." Additionally, the presence of "objective
regularities" in nature and society, render the Soviets confident
that they can anticipate the enemy's actions, develop appropriate
weapons and countermeasures, and predict the course and outcome
3
of military conflicts.
This degree of certainty and confidence should not be taken
as mere dogma, but as a basic component of a genuine world view,
on which Soviet decision-makers can be expected to act. Thus, to
2 ...Chuyev and Mikhaylov, Forecasting in Military Affairs .







a Marxist-Leninist-trained military commander or leader,
everything is quantifiable, measurable, and predictable. Attacks
will be initiated when the mathematically correct correlation of
forces is achieved and not before; the scientifically proven
combat effectiveness of one combination of weapons and tactics
will determine its employment over another; the intentions and
behavior of the enemy can be graphically plotted, and correct
counter-measures timely employed. The U.S. commander would do
well to familiarize himself with his opponents method of
decision-making, and avoid the costly mistakes which are
inevitable in mirror-imaging.
A second major insight which is revealed in Chuyev s work,
is concerned with Soviet perceptions of our methods of
forecasting and decision-making. Chuyev readily admits that a
major impetus for his book was the near complete lack of Soviet
writings on the subject of forecasting systems. He quotes
liberally from Western sources, attributing to them a degree of
authoritativeness which is at once satisfying and disarming.
Thus, for example, he praises the ground-breaking work done at
Rand Corporation in the 1950s and 60s on systems analysis and
heuristic forecasting methods, and the work of Charles Hitch in
4the Defense budgeting process.
Chuyev cites the "Delphi" projects conducted by RAND in
1963-64, designed around mathematical manipulation of experts'
responses to successive "rounds" of questionnaires on a range of
topics; also, Charles Hitch, Decision-making for Defense,
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1965)
.
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How should we interpret this book? It is a highly technical
work, requiring a solid footing in mathematics, statistics, and
operations research for full comprehension. However, even
without such a background, a great deal can be apprehended. On
the one hand, even with no knowledge of transcendental equations
or the many methods of mathematical modeling (of which Chuyev
makes great use) , we can appreciate the way Soviet decision-
makers will think, and the way they treat the many uncertainties
in the "fog of war." In short, they feel that there are no
uncertainties, and their approach to conflicts will reflect that
belief. There is nothing that can't be quantified, measured,
categorized and mastered. In this, there is something we might
learn. They have methods for calculating the correlation of
forces and combat effectiveness. Though their methods might seem
excessively rigid and mechanistic to us, they nonetheless have a
method and they use it. And we, regrettably, do not.
On the other hand, Chuyev' s work provides a modicum of
encouragement. The fact that a well-respected scholar and
scientist recognizes the considerable advantages we enjoy in
employing systems analysis, heuristics, and subjective factors in
military forecasting, should tell us that we are at least doing
something right. Even more encouraging, however, is the fact
that the Soviets may have developed an approach to the subject of
military forecasting that is consonant with the U.S. approach.
In this way, the two superpowers might diminish the chance of
widely divergent forecasts, which are a major factor in causing
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unintended conflicts.
Chuyev s work, then, provides commentary not only on the
Soviet's way of doing things, but on our own, as well. With
luck, perhaps we can both learn from the other.
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FUNDAMENTALS OF THE THEORY OF TROOP CONTROL
by
P. K. Altukhov, et. al
Reviewed by: DOUGLAS E. WALKER
Fundamentals of the Theory of Troop Control is a manual
intended to provide a general familiarization of command and
control fundamentals for officers of all ranks, but is aimed
primarily at mid-to-senior-level officers, with generally ten and
more years of service and/or a military staff background. The
manual addresses few specifics beyond providing examples to
underscore a general element of planning or control. 18,000 copies
were printed, commensurate with the annotated statement that the
manual is intended for officers of the Armed Forces. Within the
hierarchy of Soviet military thought, this work addresses troop
control at and below the level of strategic operations, down to
approximately the cast or regimental staff level. Throughout the
book the terms 'operation' and 'battle' were used interchangeably
or simultaneously, and the principles discussed were applicable at
the aforementioned levels. The importance of the book and
acceptance of the principles contained therein is indicated by its
having been reviewed for use as a text for officers attending
Soviet military academies.
Developing a theory of troop control became a subject which
appeared in the Soviet general staff journal Voyennaya Mysl '
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(Military Thought) in the October 1965 (no. 10) issue, and with
increasing regularity afterwards. In that issue Col P.
Shemanskiy voiced the question of the need to develop a theory of
troop control. Following his article, in the February 1966 (no.
2) issue, three colonels and a major argued the need for the
development of a scientific theory troop control to replace the
terse explanation contained in a 1965 military encyclopedia. The
discussion of developing a theory of troop control continued in
later issues of the journal, centered primarily upon what
specifics should be included in that development. A major
article during the discussion, published in June 1970, was
written by Major General A. Tatarchenko, one of the authors of
the final version, and much of his article can be found in the
final product.
Fundamentals of Control begins with a discussion of the
theory of troop control by establishing its importance for
obtaining maximum combat potential from available forces. It
predictably supports its principles by citing "correct"
scientific and dialectic interpretation of history, including
Marxist-Leninist dogma presented in surrogate historical lessons
cited from the Great Patriotic War, during which commanders
exercising effective troop control in conformity with Leninist
principles of leadership achieved brilliant victories which
offset the ineffectiveness of countries fighting in the West,
and enabled Russia to win the war. The Leninist work style is
extolled as being creative and highly scientific, without self-
115
will or triteness, and is characterized by being efficient,
businesslike, and having round-the-clock conviction made possible
by communist moral fiber.
This manual presents principles of Soviet troop control in
the context of challenges to that control expected to be
encountered on the battlefield. Three distinct themes are
apparent in Soviet concerns for control and planning. First, the
need for scientifically sound planning. Subsets to the sound
planning theme are the need for the commander to; ensure the time
allowed for units to achieve their goals is neither more nor less
that the time allotted; provide flexibility to allow for weapons
of mass destruction; plan for coordination between al units,
including naval units if operating near a coast; use heuristic
and mathematical models to forecast possible outcomes of an
operation as a whole and as individual tasks; and finally, that
the commander has personal responsibility to the CPSU for the
success or failure of his plan.
The second theme is the need to monitor the execution of the
plan. Subsets to the monitoring theme include the need to
maintain close contact with all command levels, the critical
nature of timely and accurate flow of information, the need to
keep all secondary or mobile command posts informed of the
progress of the operation (battle) at all time in order to ensure
a smooth and timely switch from one command post to another can
be achieved as conditions demand, and that the commander has
personal responsibility to the CPSU for the effectiveness of his
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monitoring of the operation (battle) . The book works at cross
purposes in this theme— in one are it supports allowing
creativity and flexibility among subordinates, but in another
underscores the importance of planning so thorough that no
detail, however small, is unaccounted for. the recurrent theme
of the commander's personal responsibility to the CPSU is, quite
obviously, the solution to the apparent disparity between the two
ideas.
The third theme is the need for stability and continuity of
control during conditions under which operations (battles) are
expected to take place. One subset of this theme directly
addresses conditions and threats expected to be encountered
during an operation (battle) . These include, but are not limited
to, electronic countermeasures, reconnaissance/sabotage, airborne
assault, airmobile force attack, weapons of mass destruction, and
lasers and other unspecified technologically advanced weapons.
Another subset addresses principles through which the requisite
stability and continuity is achieved—secrecy, defense and
dispersal of alternate (to replace a main) and auxiliary (to
control forces dispersed from the main axis) control points.
Emphasis was placed upon the need for dispersed alternate and
auxiliary control points to provide a counter to the
psychological environment of a nuclear war, as well as provide a
system for ensuring continuation of the operation (battle) in the
event of a failure of communications. In this regard, the work
stresses the importance of keeping all subordinate command points
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apprised of the progress of the operation (battle) , as well as
the commander's intentions. Movement of command points in
correct with troop advances is also indicated as a critical
element of maintaining stability and continuity. the
incorporation of automated troop control systems is advocated,
with the caution that the systems must be evaluated for their
value in accuracy and support requirements, to avert adverse
impact on control continuity. The text notes that automated
control systems may create excessive support demands, which
cannot be easily met under battle conditions, and that in
evaluating the usefulness of such systems key issues to consider
are; accuracy, speed, security, expansion capacity,
compatibility, reliability, survivality, and serviceability. The
text devoted special attention to was the need to successfully
transition from peacetime training to wartime effort with maximum
speed, smoothness and continuity. As always, the commander is
personally responsible to the CPSU for the stability and
continuity of control during an operation (battle)
.
Fundamentals of the Theory of Troop Control is a work which
should be read by any officer anticipating the possibility of
leading or directing combat forces against Soviet units. It
contains principles of control and communication which should be
acknowledged and anticipated prior to engaging Soviet forces in
the field, as well as revealing what the Soviets envision as the
conditions most likely to effect the conduct of operations
(battle) in the near future. It should also be read by anyone
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seeking to gain insight into the battlefield the Soviets expect
to conduct operations on. By discussing what principles are
important, and what to expect in planning operations of battles,
Control reveals the command and control areas considered
important by the Soviets, and what threats they expect to effect
their C2 capabilities in the field. Additionally, the book
provides noteworthy ideas which may be of value to officers of
Western battle staffs open to ideas of merit, wherever found.
Finally, the book provides fundamental principles of troop
control to which Soviet staffs are expected to adhere, and
therefore would be of interest to any reader studying Soviet





P.T. Yegorov, et. al.
Reviewed by: STEVEN A. WHITE
Civil Defense is a 1970 handbook written by the Soviet
instructors for use by engineering and liberal arts students.
Their goal was to explain civil defense measures and proper methods
of protection, and thus help students to be effective formation
leaders in any war involving the use of weapons of mass
destruction.
A bend of easy reading, technical information, and political
propaganda, Civil Defense reflects little serious effort to create
a tight, smoothly flowing work. Discussions overlap, and each
author pays individual homage to the Party and Lenin. Further,
there is no conclusion to tie the chapters together and no
reference citations. The result is mosaic — as though off-the-
shelf pamphlets and literature were thrown together in response to
higher tasking. Nonetheless, the book provides a valuable survey
of the entire Soviet civil defense program in a single volume, and
encompasses both theoretical and practical aspects.
The book promotes three primary themes. The first is that
this program is necessary only because of aggressive behavior by
the West. The authors maintain the Soviets have made every effort
to ensure world peace, but a Western-inspired arms race threatens
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to unleash thermonuclear war. They contend imperialist doctrine
emphasizes surprise and relies on nuclear weapons, so the USSR may
be subjected :to nuclear strikes with little warning during the
initial phase of a war. Consequently, the government and Party
were forced to create a program for "protecting the population,
creating necessary conditions for maintaining operational stability
of the national economy in wartime, and, if the enemy uses weapons
of mass destruction, performing rescue and urgent emergency-
restoration work." 1 The program was subordinated to the Ministry
of Defense and closely integrated with military defense. 2 In
addition to explaining the rationale, mission and goals of civil
defense, the authors outline organizational concepts,
responsibilities, and training programs. They also discuss the
Party's role, though in considerably less detail that other topics.
The authors' second theme is that workers are the country's
most valuable asset; if they can be saved, everything else can be
restored. Therefore, protecting the population is crucial and
can be accompanied only by long-term, intense efforts on a mass
scale. Compulsory training, education, and advance planning are
1 P.T. Yegorov et. al., Civil Defense , xvii. This definition
of goals agrees with that contained in the 1970 Great Soviet
Encyclopedia (translated 1975)
.
2Civil defense was given a boost by Brezhnev in 1972, when
its head was granted co-equal status with military service chiefs
and given the title Deputy Minister of Defense. See: David Rees,
Soviet Preparedness (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict,
1984) 23.
3P.T. Yegorov et. al., Civil Defense , 71.
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essential. To this end, the authors devote significant attention
to the characteristics and detection techniques for chemical,
biological, and radiological weapons. They explain the warning,
evacuation and dispersion process and provide detailed plans for
constructing blast and fallout shelters/ They also furnish
practical information on official and improvised personal
protective devices. Perhaps the weakest point of the book, though,
is its discussion of nourishment. While it tediously addresses
such details as exact settings for DP-3 roentgenometers,
appropriate colors for fallout shelter heating pipes, and actions
to be taken if in a movie theater when a warning sounds, the book
provides scant specifics on food and drink.
Yegorov comments that "to wreck the enemy's economy has always
been the purpose of war." 5 From this blunt assessment flows the
third major theme: national economic installations must be given
all possible protection. This is especially important in modern
warfare because nuclear weapons blur the distinction between front
and rear, and can destroy a city with single strike. Therefore,
the authors contend, all urban and industrial planning must be
undertaken with civil defense in mind. Factories should be
designed to safeguard workers and ensure the survival of expensive
or unique equipment. Civil Defense explains how each industrial
40n pages 74-75, Shlyakhov notes that if left unprotected, 90
percent of a city's population would die. By conducting a thorough
dispersal, losses would amount to only "several" percent.
5Ibid., 163.
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plant must make plans and take actions to ensure it can continue
independent production until normal conditions return. That means
maintaining resource reserves and being preparp^ conduct post-
attack reconnaissance, rescue and restoration activities.
When analyzing this book, one must remember its context.
Published in 1970, Civil Defense was presumably one of higher
education's answers to the 23rd Party Congress' call to improve
civil defense training nation-wide. It reflects the 1960s Soviet
image of future war — inevitable nuclear conflict between
imperialist and socialist states, targeting major cities and
industrial centers, and involving a wide geographical area. At
the time, the U.S. was pressing for acceptance of the mutually
assured destruction (MAD) concept, because it lacked any meaningful
active defense against nuclear attack. The Kremlin, preferring a
strategy of deterrence based on denial rather than punishment,
rejected MAD. 6 By demonstrating its determination to prepare for
and survive nuclear war, the USSR hoped to convince imperialists
they could not achieve their war objectives. Thus, civil defense
was regarded as an integral part of the military strategy defined
by Sokolovsky, and recognized as influencing three of the four
potentials (economic, moral/political, military, and scientific)
which affect the outcome of war.
6Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Trends in Soviet Military Policy," in
Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe , ed. H.J. Ellison (Seattle:
University of Washington, Press, 1983) : 215.
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It is also useful to consider the context of 1982, when the
U.S. Government Printing Office released this translated version
of Civil Defense . At the time, there was increasing concern in
the West over Soviet intentions. During the 197 0s, the USSR had
deployed new offensive strategic weapon systems, engaged in a
buildup of naval/conventional forces, increased its "combat
readiness," and given another boost to its civil defense program. 7
Unaware that Soviet doctrine had shifted in favor of a guick
conventional war, conservatives pointed to literature such as this
book to prove the Kremlin was preparing to wage nuclear war.
Liberals countered that, because the U.S. had a declaratory policy
of targeting economic and industrial centers, the Soviet program
was a logical reaction. This led to a reemergence of the old
American debate over the rationality of nuclear war and the
effectiveness and role of civil defense.
In its essence, then, this handbook represents theoretical
and practical measures for implementing the 1970s Soviet belief
that future wars, although inevitably nuclear, can be survived by
advance planning and mass mobilization. The Soviet leadership now
agrees that nuclear war is suicidal. The fact that civil defense
continues to be officially integrated into Soviet military strategy
David Rees notes the Soviets also attempted to deny the
existence of its civil defense effort, even changing the name of
the Moscow Military School of Civil Defense to Higher Command
School of Road and Engineer Troops.
o
Robert Scheer criticizes the Reagan administration for
promoting nuclear war as winnable in his book With Enough Shovels;
Reagan. Bush & Nuclear War .
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probably should not unduly concern Westerners, for several reasons.
First, civil defense is still valid for conventional wars, and so
will not be abandoned lightly. Second, like any bureaucracy, the
Soviet apparatus resists change. Finally, one might actually
anticipate increasing emphasis on civil defense as the Soviet
military transitions toward "defensive sufficiency." Nonetheless,
because the function remains subordinate to the Ministry of
Defense, any discussions of civil defense capabilities and
strategies will continue to be of interest to those (e.g., nuclear
strategists and planners, arms control negotiators) who monitor
Soviet military planning.
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ECONOMIC CONFLICT IN WARFARE
by
S.A. Bartenev
Reviewed by: MICHAEL L. DONNER, SR.
The book Economic Conflict in Warfare in the author's
words:" ... discusses matters of economic conflict in light of
the growing military threat, which is the fault of (American)
imperialism." This ostensible view, however, belies the main
purpose of the book, which seems to be a warning to the socialist
"brotherhood of nations" that they have in large degree lost the
economic might to compete successfully in war with their western
adversaries; and that new factors which can swing the correlation
of forces back to a favorable condition for the Soviet Union by
offsetting these economic disadvantages must be found if the USSR
is to prevail in war. The author, a Doctor of Economic Sciences,
seems to be attempting to make this clear as the Soviet Union
enters a period of even steeper economic decline.
The book has three main themes. The first theme developed
by the author seems to be to integrate fully the economic sphere
of the war on a co-egual basis with the other factors that
comprise the spectrum of warfare: political factors, ideological
factors, and armed conflict. He writes: "We know that war is
not limited to armed struggle. It also involves other forms of
struggle-economic, political, and ideological ... the
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significance of economic factors lies not just in the fact that
they provide the material and technical foundation of a war.
Economic means are also a weapon and the object of armed struggle
. .
.
" . Lest he tread on any influential military toes, the author
is quick to point out the importance of the armed struggle in
war: "Warfare consists mainly of armed struggle . . . Economic
struggle furthers and is subordinate to the armed struggle;" yet
the author points out that, as with the economic sphere, the
armed struggle sphere is likewise subordinated to the political
and policy goals of the Communist Party, and, thus, he concludes:
"All of this shows that the results of war are not achieved by
purely military means alone, that war is a military and an
economic ... conflict between the sides."
Having stated his broad philosophical assertion that the
economic sphere is important in warfare, the author then proceeds
to specifics in how the economic sphere can influence the outcome
of war. In doing this, he speaks of a concept well-known to
Soviet military theorists; i.e. , the "stability of the rear"
dictum deemed by Stalin to be of the utmost importance to the
victory in the Great Patriotic War. The author, while not using
the Stalinist term, is clearly speaking of this stability when he
writes: "The theory that under wartime conditions all (economic)
sectors are engaged exclusively in satisfying (the military
effort) , leaving no resources for meeting civilian needs
needs no refutation because it is contrary to common sense." In
other words, one of the major missions of the economic potential
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of the Soviet Union in a war will be to provide for the basic
subsistence of the Soviet people, thus stabilizing the rear area
and freeing the army to fight the enemy. The autb r also asserts
that this economic rear, given its high importance, must be
protected; he sees it to be extremely vulnerable: "The increased
vulnerability of the economic rear is due not only to the
appearance of new and extremely destructive weapons, . . . (but
also) chemical weapons, ... toxic chemicals, napalm, and new
types of ammunition." Interestingly, along these same lines of
"rear stability," the author lists nuclear strikes against
economic targets and aerial bombing of industrial centers as
plausible economic strategies; this seems to be an indication
that the Soviets continue to see a counterforce mission for
strategic weapons directed against economic targets. (1)
Having developed the importance of the economic sphere in
war, the author introduces and defines another term: military-
economic potential. It must be remembered that this book was
written in 1986, two years into the process of glasnost;
therefore, the economic shortcomings of the Communist system were
beginning to become apparent. In the definition of this new
concept, the author seems to be indicating that the total
economic output of nation is not the determining factor in the
economic sphere in war. "Military-economic potential is
designated for meeting military needs. It embraces not all but
only a certain portion of economic resources-financial,
production, and human Military-economic potential (is) the
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maximum portion of the economic potential which can be used for
military purposes." Thus, the author seems to be asserting that
the aggregate- economic indicators that put the West in such a
superior economic position vis-a-vis the socialist bloc do not
necessarily mean that the Soviet Union will be economically
dominated in a future war; by devoting a larger percentage of its
economic product to the military sphere the Soviet Union can
maintain military-economic parity with the West, if not by
classic economic indicators, then by its military-economic
potential. Ironically, this percentage of GNP devoted to the
military is one of the major indices that the United States uses
to determine the sincerity of the Soviet Union's stated desire to
lessen tension in the world. Therefore, a potential for
misunderstanding exists; whereas the United States sees an
increase in the percentage of GNP devoted to the military as a
belligerent action, the Soviet Union could very well, under this
theory military-economic potential, view it as their only option
in offsetting the tremendous-economic advantage of the western
alliance.
Another mechanism by which the economic sphere of war can be
brought to bear by an adversary is the use of "economic
blackmail" in a period absent any overt armed conflict between
two belligerents; judging by the rhetoric which is used to
denounce this type of action, it is clear that the author sees in
this type of economic pressure a great danger for the socialist
countries of the world: "Imperialism is attempting to find
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acceptable means of aggression . . . economic warfare is one of
those means. Experience has shown that the U.S. is attempting to
make extensive use of the weapon of economic blackmail."
Interestingly, in the face of the massive defense buildup of both
the superpowers in the 1980s, the author sees an economic as well
as military motive on the part of the U.S.: "One of the features
... of interdependence of the military-economic rivalry." Again,
in another section of the book, the author states:" ...the
economic weapon is an extremely flexible and convenient form of
action against the enemy." Obviously, he thinks the mechanism of
economic pressure (through, for example, trade embargoes and
economic sanctions) is both efficient and effective. Even though
the Soviet Union was really in no position to exert any type of
economic pressure on anyone in 1986, the author does go to great
lengths to point out all the strategic minerals which the U.S.
lacks and needs to import. The implication here is clear; the
Soviet Union, occupying a mineral-rich continent, can perhaps
through this mechanism exert some economic pressure on the West.
To conclude the first major theme of the book: the author
works very hard to care out a niche for the economic sphere of
warfare, if not a niche co-equal to armed conflict, then one that
sill can play a determining role in the outcome of a war. It can
do this be affecting the stability of the rear areas of the army
and, prior to the armed conflict even starting, by influencing
world events by imposing economic pressure on a potential
adversary. Furthermore, the USSR should remain undaunted by the
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supposed economic superiority of the West in that, by devoting a
larger share of national economic output to the military sector,
it can keep its military-economic potential on par with its
adversaries.
The second major theme of the book is the concept of the
"correlation of military-economic potentials." Again, in this
theme, the author tries to lessen the importance of the fact that
the West has achieved economic superiority over the Soviet Union:
"In the comparison of military-economic potentials, a great deal
of attention is given to ...calculating their basic components
... It should be borne in mind that the correlation of military-
economic potential depends on many circumstances, the nature of
the conflict, its scope and duration ..." In this passage, the
author seems to be saying that the Soviet Union's disadvantage
economically vis-a-vis the West can be offset by the "scope and
duration" of the conflict; i.e., the USSR can hope to win only a
somewhat limited conflict of short duration. The author returns
three more times to this same point: "The assessment of the
balance of power cannot be based merely on mathematical
calculations of the possibilities of the states, on a simple
summation of the magnitude of the individual factors." Again:
"...it (is) necessary to fully consider the aggregate of the
factors . . . out of which are formed the actual capabilities and
forces of the sides." Finally: "The Leninist methodology for
analyzing the correlation of forces. . . shows that even if the
imperialist enemy has superiority in material resources
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factors which compensate for and equalize that superiority can
and must be found." Thus, it is an obviously important theme to
the author; the Soviet Union, regardless of the concept of
military-economic potential developed in the first theme, is
lagging the West in economic development. Given that military-
economic potential is an important factor in the outcome of a
war, the Soviet Union must, if it wishes to avoid defeat by the
West in war, must find a factor to offset its economic
inferiority.
The third major theme of the author deals with what he calls
"technological warfare." It is obviously another area of great
concern to this author. he states: "The main attention (of the
United States) is . . . devoted ... to the development of
qualitatively new systems." Not surprisingly, the Strategic
Defense Initiative leads off his list of examples, in this area.
Concurrent with this policy, the U.S. has expanded a program
aimed at denying technological exports to socialist countries,
with the "...ultimate goal (of isolating) the socialist nations
from modern technology, to retard their economic development and
destroy the strategic military parity." Again, recognizing the
inability of the Soviet Union to produce its own technology (b
ut, of course, not saying so) , the author seems extremely fearful
the his country will be left behind by the technological
revolution. All he can do, however, is take solace in the
dialectical processes of history in which he so fervently
believes: "The Laws of social development can neither be ignored
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nor witted, no matter how hard the ruling circles of the
imperialist powers try to do so. The course of history is
inexorable, and no kind of technological refinement can place
obstacles in its path ... The imperialists' hopes of frustrating
... economic,, scientific, and technological progress in the
socialist commonwealth are clearly baseless and futile."
Interestingly, in only a very few instances does he claim the
socialist countries have the capability of keeping up with the
West on technological grounds.
In conclusion, the book stripped of its Marxist-Leninist
diatribes and Soviet version of historical analysis, paints a
very gloomy picture of the economic potential of the Soviet Union
to fight a war with the western alliance. Author draws somewhat
startling conclusions, such as the one that the USSR must find
other favorable correlations of forces to offset its economic
inferiority, one of which might be the "scope and duration" of
the next conflict. In the area of the "technology war," it is
clear to the author that the technological potential of the West
is vastly superior to that of the socialist bloc; this is evident
by his claim that only through the "laws of social development"
will the West be unable to subdue the Soviet Union with its
technology. The author clearly feels that, in order to fight and
win the next war, the Soviets must come up with a factor which
can offset their economic impotence and their technological
backwardness. It seems reasonably certain that a book utilizing
this tone could only come from the era of glasnost, when the true
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picture of the economic dilemma in which the Soviet Union found
itself came clearly to light. One thing is for certain, the
military-economic potential of the Soviet Union as it stands
today would not be sufficient to fight and win a protracted war
with the west. Thus, perhaps the more likely scenario involving
a possible conflict with the Soviet Union in the near future will
(as unlikely as that overall situation seems to be right now in
this time of decreasing tensions) involves a short timeframe
scenario, where the West does not get the chance to utilize its
vast economic advantage. It is obvious that, for the Soviet
Union, anything else would be unfeasible.
ENDNOTE
1. This recognition of economic targets as subject to nuclear
strikes by the U.S. is interesting because, from the beginning of
the Reagan administration, many U.S. nuclear theorists had
questioned the effectiveness of such targeting. For example,
Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, writing in "Foreign Policy" in the
summer of 1980, said: "In the late 1970s, the United States
targeted a range of Soviet economic entities that were important
either to war-supporting industry or to economic recovery. The
rationale for this targeting scheme was, and remains, fragile.
War-supporting industry is important only for a war of
considerable duration or a period of postwar defense
mobilization. Moreover, although recovery from war is an
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integral part of the Soviet theory of victory, it is less
important than the achievement of military success ...thus the
current trend _is to move away from targeting the... economy."
(Source: Bobbitt, Philip, et al., U.S. Nuclear Strategy, A
Reader, New York University Press, Washington Square, NY, 1989,
p. 473) . Thus, it appears that even though the U.S. declaratory
policy seemed to be moving away from nuclear attacks on economic
targets, the Soviets still see this type of attack as a viable
threat.
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PROTECTION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC FACILITIES
FROM WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A HANDBOOK
by
G.P. Demidenko
Reviewed by: DIEGO R. CORRAL
Protection of National Economic Facilities From Weapons of
Mass Destruction was translated into English and published by the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service as a JPRS Report, 08 August
1988.
The book is a ready reference source. Its information helps
in the analysis of the effects of modern weaponry on the
infrastructure of a nation. It also shows ways to minimize the
potential damage to the socio-political-economic system of a
country that the use of weapons of mass destruction would cause.
Demidenko believes that the Western World is on the way to
achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union through the
utilization of nuclear weapons in an armed conflict. He notes that
the United States is preparing to take the arms race into space.
This aggressive nature, he notes, is the opposite of the policy of
the USSR, which proposes a realistic plan to terminate the nuclear
global threat and annihilate all weapons of mass destruction to
provide a safer world. Demidenko' s analysis of the status of the
current political world and its instability shows the need for the
Soviet Union to respond against this external threat by increasing
its defensive strength and preparing its armed forces to repel any
foreign aggression.
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The author considers that future war will involve weapons of
mass destruction. These weapons, with their capability to inflict
enormous destructive power and great injury, will turn the front
and rear lines into one battleground. Cities and rural areas alike
will be affected by the horrendous power of these weapons.
The human losses and the material damages would be so enormous
that the ability of a nation to survive would be proportional to
the amount of preparations taken during peacetime to ensure proper
protection of the population against weapons of mass destruction
and the continuation of the national economic apparatus in wartime.
The main objective of this book is to help the Soviet Union
prepare for an eventful attack by weapons of mass destruction. It
seeks to make clear the effects of these weapons upon the Soviet
society and the means to nullify the effects through proper command
control and physical infrastructure readiness. One could easily
say that this publication contains valuable information for
establishments that deal with civil defense matters (the intended
audience), but also for a wide spectrum of users.
The book is clearly divided into two parts. In the first part
the author provides a description of the combat features and the
principles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and conventional
weapons. This part is an excellent introductory course in weapons
of mass destruction. After digesting all the presented literature
one could understand the intricacies of nuclear weapons from the
manufacture to the effects of its detonation; the inhumane nature
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of chemical weapons, their production, application,
conceptualization and destruction of humans and nature; the
bacteriological agents that produce large-scale injuries to people,
animals and crops through biological weapons; and the conventional
weapons with all of their types and applications. In this section
of the book it is interesting to note that the author cites only
the America's nuclear delivery platform, its chemical-
bacteriological arsenal and the delivery ways that the United
States will use them and the areas that it will target. It makes
no reference to the USSR weapons arsenal or its employment policy.
The second part of the book addresses the destructive effects
that these weapons have upon buildings, installations, and people.
In this section the user is presented with several scenarios and
problem solving technigues to assess the capabilities of: the
different manufacturing production complexes with their material
and technical supply systems; the supporting services; and the
organizational workforce available to withstand the destructive
effects of nuclear explosions and to design methods and measures
to increase their survivability and enhance their stability.
Demidenko does an excellent job addressing the effects that
wartime has on the functioning of industrial complexes. He points
out the necessity for stability of the nation's economic
facilities, and shows the means to measure readiness to react when
affected by a nuclear explosion.
The last portion of the book contains useful charts of data
to be utilized for calculating the parameters mentioned before.
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It's interesting to realize that the book is directed toward
the possible destruction of the economical structure of the Soviet
Union due tc a possible nuclear attack.
I fault the writer for not taking into consideration that
catastrophic damages could also result from disturbances of nature
due to human technical error, such as the Chernobyl incident. I
believe the reference book could have gained enormously if the
author had dedicated a chapter to the Chernobyl disaster, the
lessons learned, and practical data gathered from such incidents.
The book is written in a technical form, and sometimes suffers from
too much detail. It is written primarily for a professional reader
with a good technical understanding. The subject matter of this
publication was presented at academic seminars by Demidenko and his
coauthors at the Kiev Institute of Technology. I recommend this
book to anyone interested in the effects of weapons of mass
destruction and how an affected nation can survive as an entity.







SOVIET NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE GREAT
PATRIOTIC WAR 1941-1945
by
V.I. Achkasov and N.B. Pavlovich
Reviewed by: K. MICHELLE EMERSON
Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945
,
written by V.I. Achkasov and N.B. Pavlovich, two respected Soviet
historians, analyzes the development of Soviet naval science (which
includes the strategic use of naval forces, their strategy, and
tactics) as it evolved out of lessons learned during combat
incidents of the Great Patriotic War.
The book critically examines the navy's mission during the
war years and attempts to explain why situations happened the way
they did, given the unprecedented scale and intensity of the Soviet
navy's mission.
Major themes of the book that will be looked at include: 1)
basically correct prewar employment of resources and forces, 2)
heroic efforts of naval personnel despite limitations, 3) problems
of combined operations, 4) problems of responsibility within the
chain of command and, 5) the lack of respect for the Soviet navy.
The first theme to emerge points out that prewar strategic
and operational employment of resources and forces were basically
correct. "To a considerable extent the experience of the Great
Patriotic War reaffirmed the correctness of prewar views on the
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defense of our own maritime lines of communication." 1 Not all
prewar tactics were correct, however. The authors state that "the
severe demands_ of combat activity caused a significant change in
prewar views concerning the standards of positioning a landing
2force aboard transports; ..."
The next theme appeared throughout the book as pride for the
heroic efforts of naval personnel despite limited plans, personnel
and equipment. With their help, the Soviets were able to triumph
over the Fascist Germans. "Thanks to the heroic efforts of the
Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, the Northern Fleet was
reinforced, enabling it to launch combat operations against enemy
3
sea lanes and to achieve significant successes."
The third theme deals with the multitude of problems with
combined operations—and the seriousness of reevaluating them. As
a result of these operations, future decision-making was shaped.
In one example it is shown that "lack of knowledge about the
characteristics and capabilities of naval artillery on the part of
joint force commanders and . . the meager organization of target
4 ...
reconnaissance.." we severe inadequacies in the use of artillery
support at the beginning of the war. In another case "tactical
V.I. Achkasov and N.B. Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations in
the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 , (English translation by United














cooperation between aircraft and submarines remained for all
5practical purposes, an unsolved problem.."
Soviet naval science changed as a result of problems found
within the chain-of-command. One of the best examples of this
concerns amphibious landings. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet executed
a successful landing because "the commander of the designated
forces. .himself selected the landing sector." This was as opposed
to all previous landings "when the landing sectors were decided at
7higher command levels.." and inevitably failed. The authors also
detail a combat situation in which the abandonment of the Khar'kov
might have been avoided if "a bold and timely decision by the
o
commander in chief at a moment of crisis," had been made without
9fear of being blamed "in event of failure.."
The last major theme that is perhaps the most noticeable, is
the lack of respect for the Soviet navy and its accompanying
frustration for naval personnel. In case after case, the Navy
requested assistance or a desire to provide more assistance, only
to be turned down. For example, the Northern Fleet lacked naval
aircraft and was obliged to ask the Fourteenth Army to assign






8 Ibid. P- 279.
9 Ibid.
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was also short of aircraft and a situation had developed that
eventually resulted in the Navy supporting the ground forces!
Even within the Navy, the surface fleet always paled in comparison
to submarines for inflicting the greatest losses to the enemy.
"The relative significance of operations by each of the various
types of Northern Fleet forces against enemy sea lanes remained the
same..: submarines inflicted the greatest losses.. and finally
surface ships, which again shared last place with the coastal
artillery." 11
The essence of the book appears to be the need to applaud the
Soviet navy's efforts during the entire war period, gaining
valuable lessons for the current debates revolving around the
mission of the Soviet navy.
The book has much to offer. When considering who should read
it, the recommendation is made that readers should include, but not
be limited to, historians, naval officers, and World War II
enthusiasts.
1 Ibid. .p. 199.
11Ibid .p. 210.
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THE SEA POWER OF THE STATE
by
S . G . Gorshkov
Reviewed by: MICHAEL J. UDELL
Introduction
The sea power of the State as defined by S.G. Gorshkov is the
"capability of a country to utilize the military-economic resources
of the ocean for its own purposes." Unlike most Western authors,
Gorshkov readily acknowledge that a nation's sea power is not
manifested by its naval forces alone, but rests in the unified
efforts of the naval, transport, fishing, scientific-oceanographic,
and other fleets. Within this system of forces the State's Navy
is dominating and is given primary emphasis in his book.
Gorshkov 's goal in the writing of this major work appears to
be education of the political and military leaders regarding the
massive growth of the Soviet Navy, its role within armed forces,
and its importance as a tool in modern foreign policy. The book
is intended to act as a bridge between the military doctrine handed
down to Gorshkov from above and the reality of building and
employing a modern navy. The book also shows the State exactly
what it has, and will continue to get, in return for its enormous
naval investment. Gorshkov ' s claim that the book is intended
primarily for military readers is plainly contradicted
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by the usually large printing run, which indicates that the true
audience is much broader.
In support of the goal outlined above, there aivi several major
themes evident throughout the work. THe themes are presented in
this document in a subjective order of importance assigned by the
reviewer. No attempt has been made to adhere to the format of
Gorshkov's book.
1. THE PROPER ROLE OF SEA POWER IS TO INFLUENCE EVENTS ASHORE .
While this is a familiar theme in most Western naval writings,
Gorshkov argues for the supremacy of direct strike over the more
traditional methods of sea control. Gorshkov claims that there
exists a new naval mission of "crushing the military-economic
potential of the enemy through direct action from the sea against
vitally important centers." Gorshkov also states that "sea
attacks against enemy territory have become the Soviet navy's basic
mission." Gorshkov envisions the accomplishment of this mission
through the use of nuclear powered strike submarines and, to a
lesser extent, carrier based strike aircraft.
In addition to advocating the Soviet navy's shore strike
mission, he warns of the formidable Western shore strike capability
and their need to defend against it. To use Gorshkov's words
"protecting one's own soil from attack by the enemy's navy is
becoming the main goal of the navy."
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2. NATIONS USE SEA POWER TO EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD .
Gorshkov__uses the histories of the "imperial ist" nations to
repeatedly emphasize this theme. Often in the same paragraph he
condemns the aggressive expansionist policies of nations like
France, England, and the United States; and then points out that
the principal reason underlying their successful periods of
expansion was the effective use of sea power. Gorshkov states that
"the navy has emerged as one of the most important instruments of
State policy." Gorshkov is very careful to properly distinguish
between the unjust "imperialist" use of sea power (gunboat
diplomacy) , and the friendly and just "socialist" assistance
afforded to developing nations.
3. CONTROL OF THE SLOC'S ARE VITAL TO NATIONS THAT EXERT A GLOBAL
INFLUENCE .
Gorshkov skillfully wields this argument like a double-edged
sword. He takes great pains to point out the weakness of the
United States brought about by our dependence on the SLOC's and
their vulnerability to Soviet naval forces. Conversely, he makes
it clear that a country with peaceful overseas commitments (like
the Soviet Union) cannot afford to allow imperialist aggressors to
deny them freedom of the seas.
Gorshkov demonstrates his correct perception that sea control
is an end in itself by defining it as a "means by which
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naval forces can carry out a specific mission in a certain region
within a stipulated time period."
4. A NAVY MUST BE BALANCED .
Gorshkov defines balance loosely as "maintaining all the
elements of combat strength in the most favorable combination."
Gorshkov speaks of balance in two distinct contexts: The internal
balance of forces within the navy, and the external balance of the
navy within the armed forces as a whole. Gorshkov spends a large
portion of his verbiage supporting this theme. The primary
conclusion of his analysis of naval history is that an unbalanced
navy is doomed to eventual failure.
Gorshkov claims that a balanced navy is "capable of carrying
out varied missions under clear and non-nuclear conditions." By
this he means that in addition to the shore strike mission, a navy
must have the ability to conduct ASW, AAW, ASUW, and defensive
operations. He also maintains that a numerically smaller but
better balanced fleet is superior to a larger but less balanced
one.
Within the context of a balanced armed forces, Gorshkov writes
that "there cannot be a sphere of warfare in which any one branch
of the armed forces is the absolute sovereign" and "the navy must
be included and work within a unified military strategy."
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5. THE NAVAL SERVICE IS BEST SUITED TO CONDUCT ARMED CONFLICT
OUTSIDE OF EUROPE .
Gorshkov writes that "the Soviet Navy today is capable of
successfully carrying out strategic missions by destroying
important targets in enemy territory and destroy submarine
platforms for nuclear weapons at sea." It is important to note
that by not mentioning the other branches of the armed forces,
Gorshkov is implying that the navy can independently conduct
strategic missions. This is a significant departure from
traditional military theory. It should also be emphasized that
outside of Europe includes the rest of the entire world. Lastly,
this theme is noteworthy because it appears only in an 11 page
segment added to the second edition entitled "The Strategic
Employment of the Navy."
6. THE NAVY OF THEE NEXT ARMED CONFLICT WILL BE BUILT DURING
PEACETIME .
Gorshkov asserts that a modern naval war will be of short
duration and will not allow either side the opportunity to
construct new combatants prior to its conclusion. It is,
therefore, of vital importance that the "development of each naval
ship must concentrate on placing the most economical mix of
dimension and displacement, assuring effective resolution of
problems at minimal cost." Gorshkov claims that a "comprehensive
system of scientific management is required to efficiently build
a navy." In support of this goal, Gorshkov calls for the
148
construction of a powerful fleet of nuclear and diesel submarines
capable of all the missions required of a balanced navy. He also
argues for the construction of naval air platforms to perform sea
and shore strikes. He lastly points out that surface ships must
be included to "give combat stability to the submarine fleet."
CONCLUSION
Gorshkov's book is of considerable importance to present day
naval readers. Contained within was a remarkably candid blueprint
for the Soviet naval buildup of the late twentieth century that has
shown little sign of change despite the historical events reshaping
Eastern Europe. Although there is a tendency to review a writing
such as this as wishful thinking on the part of the author, the
phenomenal advances in Soviet submarine technology and their
development of a modern aircraft carrier testify to the fiscal
burden that the Soviet Union was willing to bear to bring
Gorshkov's vision to fruition. It is truly remarkable that the
historically secretive Soviets would have ever allowed such a
pivotal work to be published in an unclassified form, let alone
publish it themselves for Western distribution. This work stands
firm as a rebuttal to the school of thought claiming that one must
read Russian and have access to classified material in order to
perform valid literature analysis.
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THE NAVY: ITS ROLE, PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT
AND EMPLOYMENT
by
N.P. V'yunenko, Ed., et. al
Reviewed by: JOHN D. HEARING
The Navy: Its Role. Prospects for Development, and
Employment , 1 published in 1988, remains a subject of great debate
to this day. Edited by the "Father of the Modern Soviet Navy,"
the late Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov, The Navy
was his last major work on seapower before his death in 1988. Much
of the controversy around the book has involved assessing what
impact it will have on the post-Gorshkov Navy. This is what this
paper will address.
The three main authors who worked with Gorshkov are not
lightweights in the area of naval strategy and technology. N. P.
V'yunenko is a retired Rear Admiral of the Soviet Navy and was a
major player in the writing of Gorshkov * s master treatise on
navies, The Seapower of the State . 2 Captain 1st Rank B. N. Makeyev
is a ranking naval strategist and is still on active duty3 while
V'yunenko, N. P., Rear Admiral, et al, The Navy: Its Role,
Prospects for Development, and Employment , Moscow: Military
Publishing House, 1988 (NIC Translation)
2Gorshkov, S. G.
,
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union,
The Seapower of the State . Moscow: Military Publishing House,
1979, pp. xi.
3Goure, Leon, "The Soviet Strategic View," Strategic Review ,
Vol. XVIII, Nr. 1, Winter 1989, pp. 85.
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the third author, Captain 1st Rank V. D. Skugarev, is a retired
naval armaments expert.
;
4 Gorshkov himself wrote the extensive
foreword, but was not listed as an author (as he w_3 in Sea Power
of the State ) but rather as editor, so his actual role in the
writing of this book is unclear.
It is interesting to note that only 25,000 copies of this book
were printed versus over 12 0,000 copies of the two editions of Sea
Power of the State - a significant drop in numbers. It is also
instructive to note who the book was intended for. The audience
of the book is listed in the frontispiece as "navy personnel and
readers interested in problems of the navy's development," while
Gorshkov states a few pages later:
This book is also of interest for everyone involved in
problems of scientific-technical development and that it has
been written in popular language 5
This would appear to be a large interest group for the number of
books published.
The Navy ' s focus is on the future of development of naval
power, taking past and current naval developments and attempting
to forecast the future of navies in general and the Soviet Navy in
particular, in order to determine what decisions need to be made
to keep pace with naval technological developments.
Among the major themes addressed in the book are:
uIbid, pp. 85.
5The Navy , pp. 10.
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- Importance of Oceans and SLOCs: These are described as being
important objectives in wartime and areas for conflict for all
armed forces:—
The ocean is turning more and more into an arena of combat
for all branches of the armed forces, where each of them
will make its contribution. 6
Also pointed out are "the changes occurring in the alignment of
forces in the world arena and the [need] to react appropriately to
the growing threat from sea and ocean sectors," 7 an apparent
reference to the cruise missile threat that is often repeated.
- Strategic Missions for the Services: The Navy describes the
primary missions of armed forces as being 1) to repel aerospace
attack, 2) to suppress the enemies military-economic potential, 9
and 3) to destroy groupings of enemy armed forces. 10 As Captain
William Manthorpe, USN (Ret) , Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
noted, these admissions of "new" priorities are among the first
concrete writings we have on the actual missions of the Soviet
Armed Forces under the "Defensive Doctrine."
- Special Features of Naval Developments: The Navy notes a
number of factors about naval development that make it different
than other arms development areas, including that naval equipment
6The Navy
, pp . 2 6.
7The Navy
, pp . 7
.
8The Navy , pp. 29.
9The Navv
, pp . 31.
10The Navy , pp. 32.
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and arms are especially vulnerable to scientific and technical
progress and that the lengthy service and repeated modernization
of naval vessels requires long-term forecasting. The argument is
also made that the special nature of naval warfare creates a need
for a balanced navy and:
Naval arms are an integral subsystem of the overall system
of armed forces. Therefore, naval arms must be balanced
according to missions and resources not only within the navy, but
also with arms of the other branches of the armed forces. 11
- Trends in the development of Navies: The authors go into
detailed explanation of their forecasting methodology, but the
final analysis of future naval developments include:
- Further development of strategic capabilities, especially
in sea launched missiles;
- Buildup of the striking power of general purpose forces,
principally aircraft carriers, with a potential successor being
the new generation of cruisers with air capability;
- Continued importance of the role of multi-role submarines;
- Increased capabilities for cruise missiles;
- New roles for lasers in shipboard air defense, not to
mention particle beam weapons;
Additionally, the major categories of naval forces are examined
for their own prospects:
- Surface Forces: The Navy states:
Surface ships have developed into global general-
purpose naval forces, an effective reserve of the strategic forces
and the striking power... in local wars. Aircraft carriers are the
basis of these forces. .
.
11The Navy , pp. 53.
12The Navy , pp. 100.
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- Submarines: Future development in terms of increased speed
and depth capability, increased weapons capability (improved
torpedoes, and especially cruise missiles) is expected, but it is
interesting to note that nowhere near the same emphasis was made
of submarine warfare in this book as was made in Sea Power of the
State .
- Naval Aviation: Big changes in the land based Naval
aviation that the Soviets possess today are expected:
Naval aviation is coalescing with other naval forces-
especially with the union of aircraft and ships. The
advent of cruise missiles on ships and submarines has
reduced the need for missile armed aviation in hitting
ground targets. 1
Some important points are raised multiple times, including:
- The use of the term "Naval Art" - something that has been
said not to exist at the level of Military Art.
- The role of the Navy in Strategic missions - a definite slap
at the multiple Soviet authors who have said that there are no
strategic missions for a Navy (except SSBNs)
;
- The impact of cruise missile advances and capabilities.
- The Navy as the best choice for strategic defense of the
homeland via anti-SSBN/anti-Sea Launched Cruise Missile efforts
and anti-Air Launched Cruise Missile defense.
- The impact of sea control on continental success and the
defense of the Soviet Homeland - another slap at the
continental/ground strategy proponents.
13The Navv . pp. 122.
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- The need for aircraft carriers to provide the above...
Reactions to this book were interesting to note. Western
reactions have been mixed, with views including those who regarded
it as a nuclear warfighting doctrine, 14 as Gorshkov s "Last Salvo"
(after being forced out 6 months after the ascendancy of
Gorbachev), 15 as a sales document to make a case for a large and
modernized navy in the perestroika era, 16 or as a combination sales
brochure/seapower primer for the new movers and shakers of the
Soviet Government: the civilian intellectuals and arms control
"experts" 17 . The latter theory is this author's favorite in light
of the current debate over future defense expenditures and the
apparent aiming of this book at a "popular" audience instead of a
military one. At the same time, Soviet reaction to the book was
strangely muted, especially for a book that contained such heresy
against the Ground Fores-dominated military hierarchy. Admiral
Chernavin distanced himself by stating:
The authors set down their opinions of the main strategic
tasks of tomorrow which may be of interest to a certain
group of writers to acquaint them with the general
uBrooks, Thomas, Rear Admiral, USN, "A Nuclear War-Fighting
Treatise," Proceedings . Naval Review Issue, May 1989, pp. 137.
15Herrick, Robert, CDR, USN, "A Uniquely Naval Design,"
Proceedings . Naval Review Issue, May 1989, pp. 147.
16Goure, pp. 85.
17Neely, Theodore and CAPT Steve Kime, USN, "Perestroika,
Doctrinal Change, and the Soviet Navy," Strategic Review , Vol. XVI,
Nr. 4, Fall 1988, pp. 53.
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principles of navies. 18
The only other notable reaction was a bitter denunciation of the
prospective anti-strategic platform mission of the navy by
Aleksandr Savelyev, who felt that this would increase the
possibility of escalation. 19 Beyond this, and for reasons that are
unclear, little or no notice has apparently been taken of this
book.
What will be the long-term impact of The Navy? At this
juncture it is still too early to tell. The lack of reaction in
the Soviet Union might indicate that its impact will be minimal,
but this would be unlikely for a book with Gorshkov ' s name on it.
Probably the best indicators of the impact of this book will be
the Soviet shipbuilding program. If the current aircraft carrier
program continues to progress after the adoption of the next Five
Year Plan this summer, and submarine and surface ship construction
continue at the pace, it will be obvious that "Gorshkov 1 s Final
Salvo" will have been an effective one.
18
"Chernavin Responds," Proceedings . Vol. 115. Nr. 2, February
1989, pp. 75.
19Savelyev, A. S., "NATO, Warsaw Pact Doctrines Viewed," FBIS
translation of article in MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE
OTNOSHENIYA






THE THREAT TO EUROPE
(Progess Publishers 1981)
HOW TO AVERT THE THREAT TO EUROPE
.__
(Progress Publishers 1981)
THE NEW THREAT TO EUROPE: WHO IS TO BLAME?
(Novosti Press Agency Publishing House 1984)
Reviewed by: GARY GROOMS
The following is a review and comparative analysis of three
books entitled The Threat to Europe . How to Avert the Threat to
Europe , and The New Threat to Europe: Who is to Blame? written
by a group of Soviet Academicians. The first two books were
published in response to the NATO decision to deploy Pershing II
and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) . They also serve as a
partial rebuttal to then Secretary of Defense Weinberger's Soviet
Military Power book. The third book was published after the US
began deploying the missiles in December 1983.
Printed in English, French, German, Spanish, Russian, Italian,
and Dutch, the books were aimed at the West European public, in an
effort to severely discredit and preferably reverse the NATO dual-
track decision. The NATO dual track decision was adopted on 12
December 1979 in response to Soviet SS-20 missile deployments. It
stated that NATO would begin deploying US GLCMs and Pershing II
ballistic missiles in December 1983 if no arms control agreement
had been reached between the US and USSR to restore the balance in




The first book, The Threat to Europe , written by the Soviet
Committee for European Security and published shortly after Soviet
Military Power , was meant to reflect the opinion of the Soviet
public. Written in a question and answer format, the authors
answered questions posed by an imaginary western skeptic in an
effort to dispel all the alleged myths and misperceptions the West
has of Soviet military doctrine, weapons development, and arms
control initiatives.
The writers contend that the Soviets don't seek military
superiority, only maintenance of parity. In addition, the Warsaw
Treaty Organization exists to prevent war as well as defend against
outside aggression. However, this is qualified by the belief that
defense must be equal to the aggressor in order to retaliate. The
authors accuse the West of quoting Soviet literature on battlefield
tactics out of context, in order to depict Soviet military doctrine
as offensive. Furthermore, they caution the West not to mistake
concepts of the 1960's with those of the 1970' s and 1980' s.
Accordingly, 1981 Soviet military doctrine neither allows for a
first or preemptive strike nor can there be winners in a global
nuclear war. They also assert a limited nuclear war can't be
fought
.
Due to the greater geographic area of the USSR and Warsaw Pact
as opposed to the US and NATO area, the Soviets justify a need for
large numbers of weapons, equipment, and men. Failing to mention
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the posture of their own forces, the authors justified SS-2
deployment based on forward deployment of US nuclear weapons
systems as well as British S-2 and S-3 missiles. Disregarding the
threat SS-20 missiles posed to Europe, the Soviets tagged US
missiles as strategic because they could hit targets within the
USSR.
The book stressed that nearly every new Soviet weapon system
has been built in response to weapons developed in the West.
Although they pointed to Pershing II and cruise missiles as first
strike weapons enabling limited nuclear war to take place in
Europe, they didn't mention the purpose of their own SS-20s if
limited nuclear war isn't possible in their eyes.
The writers portrayed the US as forcing INF deployment on the
West Europeans because Americans never intended to have serious INF
negotiations. Attempting to decouple the US from NATO, the US is
indicated as preferring rearmament over arms control negotiations.
To fuel the peace movement in Europe at this time, the Soviets
criticized the US for not ratifying SALT II and for rejecting a
laundry list of Soviet arms control proposals.
A book review appearing in the September 1982 edition of
Moscow's Soviet Military Review lauded the book, then launched into
further arguments in support of Soviet military doctrine. The book
also received some fairly unbiased publicity in the Washington
Post
.
New York Times , and the Baltimore Sun which viewed the book
as repudiating the offensive Soviet doctrine of the 1960 's.
How to Avert the Threat to Europe , written by a group of
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writers from the Soviet Committee for European Security and
Cooperation and the Scientific Research Council on Peace and
Disarmament is a continuation of The Threat to Europe . This book
is meant to show the West the continuity between the USSR's new
leader, Andropov, and his predecessor Brezhnev.
The book points to the 1982 Soviet pledge of no first-use of
nuclear weapons as further evidence of their defensive doctrine.
A Washington Post article in April 1983 saw the book as another
part of the Soviet campaign to prevent deployment of US INF
missiles in Europe. Perhaps subtly forecasting things to come if
the US deploys the missiles, the authors refer to the Soviet navy
as a "major ocean power," whereas in the first book the navy was
an "important sea power" which had to compensate for small allied
navies.
The New Threat to Europe; Who is to Blame? looks at the
aftermath of the US missile deployment. All guilt for a renewed
arms race is placed on the US and NATO (especially, Britain, West
Germany, and Italy since their governments were viewed as the most
cooperative with the US) . Now, the US and NATO are accused of
increasing the danger of war by accident due to decreased flight
time, as if to say Soviet control over their SS-20s is infallible.
(Note: Chernenko is the new Soviet leader now)
The peace loving Soviets of the first two books disclose their
countermeasures to the INF deployment in this book, which are: no
Geneva talks until pre-deployment conditions are returned to
Europe; a lifting of their loosely kept moratorium on SS-20
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deployments; announced preparations to deploy tactical nuclear
weapons in East Germany and Czechoslovakia; and finally, matching
the US deployment with equivalent weapons at sea.
All three book provide top quality Soviet propaganda from the
frustrated advocate of peace and disarmament to the reluctant bear
pushed back into the arms race and the cold war by the West. To
charm the Western public, the books are devoid of ideological
rhetoric. The books also offer a glimpse at possible future Soviet
arms control proposals, how they view various weapons systems, and
how geography makes the USSR unique militarily.
161
WHENCE THE THREAT TO PEACE
Reviewed by: PAUL BROWN
The Soviet government published a series of booklets entitled
"Whence the Threat to Peace" in response to "Soviet Military
Power," the series which depicts the official U.S. view of the
Soviet military build-up and ensuing threat to the West. The
"Whence the Threat to Peace" series consists of four editions
(1982), a supplemented second edition also in 1982, 1984 and 1987)
published by the military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of
Defense in Moscow. Like its American policy support program
counterpart, "Whence the Threat to Peace" presents a one-sided
explanation of the phenomenon known as the arms race and in so
doing seeks to justify the policy decisions and procurement
programs which have been undertaken by the Soviet government.
Since this is a political document drafted specifically to support
policy and does not employ methodological rigor or analytical
objectivity, no new ground is broken and no new alternatives are
explored. The principal value of this work is two-fold; it clearly
depicts the Soviet perspective of hostile encirclement by foreign
powers (via colorful graphical layouts) and more importantly
provides a source of material for examining the evolution of Soviet
defense priorization during the Reagan presidency. A simplified
form of content analysis can be used to identify and extract valid
Soviet defense themes from the voluminous guantity of propaganda
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inherent in the documents. On the lighter side, it is of
undeniable enjoyment to examine the improvement in the Soviet
Union's ability to produce slick, Madison Avenue ^tyle propaganda
which can compete with the West. Significant progress was made
from the colorless, pictureless precursor to "Whence the Threat to
Peace" entitled "The Threat to Europe." As cleverly phrased in one
book review ". . . with what Western experts consider to be an
alarming sophistication and in a remarkably short period of time,
the Soviets have closed the [color-propaganda-booklet] gap." in
fact the very cover of the publication progresses from block
lettering only, to lettering accompanied by an ICBM drawing, to
pictures of platforms of the American nuclear triad, and finally
to a true high-tech superimposing of pentagon, ICBM and Earth
images.
The Soviet sensitivity to what it clearly perceives as
hostile encirclement is presented on a series of graphics; one
depicts the forward deployed and threatening posture of U.S. forces
worldwide, others show the U.S. military overseas basing scheme and
how it can be reinforced in time of conflict while still others
depict the targets held at risk from American theater nuclear
forces. It is especially interesting to note that a graphic
introduced in the 1984 edition (pre INF treaty) projected the
coverage of NATO based Pershing II and ground launched cruise
missile (GLCM) systems using a polar coordinate construct. This
1Anthony Barbieri, Jr. "Mutual assured distraction: Soviet
flacks close "booklet 1 ." The Baltimore Sun , 18 January 1982, p. 2.
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is certainly a valid navigational orientation and one which enabled
the Soviets to show that in terms of missile range alone, major
cities in Africa, the Middle East and even Scandinavia are
potentially at risk from American INF systems in addition to cities
in Europe and the USSR. A clearly expanded public relations impact
was achieved than that which a standard Mercator projection map of
the European theater would have made possible. Depiction of
American cruise missile trajectories over Norway, and Sweden also
effectively served to exacerbate the highly sensitive implications
of cruise missile deployments and the execution of the U.S.
maritime strategy. It is critical, however, for a serious student
of strategic policy issues to visualize the world from the Soviet
perspective and appreciate the real security fears the Soviet Union
has and not to simply dismiss them as Cold War propaganda.
The source of the numbers employed by the Soviets throughout
the series for the comparison of force levels were attributed to
the respected London International Institute for Strategic and
Studies (IISS) and in later editions from various American
publications themselves (e.g. "Aviation Weekly") . As in any policy
supporting document, clever manipulation of numbers occurs and can
be identified. In addition to the manipulation which is expected,
"Whence the Threat to Peace" contains some clearly inaccurate data
and some strategically minor (yet nonetheless identifiable)
internal inconsistencies. (Internal discrepancies in Soviet
assessments of American bomber assets can be easily found for those
willing to do the basic math.) The assertion that the U.S. defense
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budget grew in excess of 13 per cent in 1978-1980 and by 19 per
cent in 1981 is simply not true and neither is their count of U.S.
uniformed manpower (the Soviets claim the U.S. has nearly three
million). The Soviets, unlike the U.S., have no excuse for these
inaccurate figures since they are a matter of public record and are
easily verified. In the latter two editions, the period 1981-1983
was selected for analysis of the U.S. defense budget and the
clearly erroneous figures of the previous editions were dropped.
Another glaring numerical discrepancy is the Soviet inclusion of
the training carrier Lexington and unusable reserve U.S. carriers
in its accounting procedure while excluding their own armor and
artillery reserves which have immediate activation potential. The
Soviets chose to compare total populations between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact rather than the more strategically significant
statistics for population of military-age men and the mobilization
assessment potential for each side.
The Soviets present a powerful case that they have
historically reacted to Western military innovation and that the
United States has misrepresented the threat at various historical
junctures (e.g. the grossly exaggerated "bomber gap" and "missile
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2gap") . They do, however, selectively choose a restrictive and
self-serving selection of procurement cases, fail to mention
objectively assess why the U.S. felt compelled to build or that
Moscow's technological base was destined to fail when attempting
to compete with Washington. When the series was published, Moscow
adamantly denied its development of binary chemical weapons (which
has since been repudiated) and in the fourth edition audaciously
accuse the U.S. of violating the ABM treaty because of an alleged
phased array radar system in Thule, Greenland. This is nothing
short of outrageous since the Soviet Krasnoyarsk phased array radar
was an obvious violation. Party-line Soviet defense priorities can
be traced through each document's presentation of the Soviet
reactive posture in the post-war arms race, an analysis of the U.S.
war machine, carefully selected factors in the East-West military
balance, and a chronology of U.S. militancy in the world as
contrasted to Soviet restraint and love for peace. To an even
greater extent that "Soviet Military Power," "Whence the Threat to
Peace," examines each competitive category from the sole
perspective of drafting superpower, in lieu of simultaneous, side-
by-side comparisons. This incomplete approach can lead all but the
2 In the second edition the Soviets demonstrate an awareness
of how to play the semantics game by including a section entitled
"How Windows are Created" in which they extol the American penchant
for the creation of paranoid "windows of vulnerability" and
"weapons gaps." They also take a semantic cheap shot by
highlighting the fact that American intercontinental nuclear forces
are titled "strategic offensive forces" whereas their weaponry is
not termed offensive because it will not be used in any offensive
role.
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sophisticated and well-versed analysis to spurious conclusions.
The omission of Soviet bases and facilities abroad (e.g. Eastern
Europe, Vietnam, Cuba, etc.) from the description of the overseas
assets enjoyed by the U.S., for example, is indicative of this
methodological construct. A more inclusive and contextually
unbiased approach would have enhanced the documents' credibility
to some degree.
Another recurring theme is the public relations improvement
inherent in the later editions. By simply not labeling the Western
allies as "bellicose partners" in the third and fourth editions (as
they were in the first two) the Soviets acknowledged that one can
catch more flies with honey than one can with flypaper. The
Soviets take excellent advantage of the U.S. bungling of the
Reykjavik Summit to charge that the Americans aren't serious about
strategic arms control. The documents are able to score political
points by selective quotations of President Reagan, Secretary of
State Haig and Presidential Counselor Edwin Meese on politically
sensitive issues, specifically the fighting of a limited nuclear
war and American willingness to reinterpret or ignore provisions
of previous arms control agreements.
The "Whence the Threat to Peace" series delivers what it
promises: a Soviet perspective of the superpower arms race. It
is intended for anyone who is interested in the issues which
comprise superpower military policy. It is a readable series which
can be digested and comprehended by the public but is also of
interest and value to the serious student of the subject since
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official government positions, despite their inherent biases, are
important to understand, analyze and debate. The publication is
a useful tool for understanding the international r. ""Utary balance
from a Soviet perspective and studying the evolution of Soviet
defence policy in the 1980' s.
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THE U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINE
by
--_ GENERIKH TROFIMENKO
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986)
Reviewed by: MICHAEL WEISS
The U.S. Military Doctrine provides an analysis of U.S.
National security policy from the time the founding fathers up to
1985 with particular emphasis paid to America's "nuclear era" of
1945 to 1985. The author is the director of the foreign policy
department of the Institute of the United States and Canada in
Moscow.
The Main theme of the book is that American policy under the
founding fathers was one of a balance of power and shifted after
1945 tc one of a "Pax Americana" thanks to the advent of the U.S. 's
nuclear arsenal. The founding fathers were described as being
well-read individuals who had a very sound understanding of
politics and international relations. The U.S., faced with a
combination of weak neighbors to the north and south and a weak
military, preferred a foreign policy based on a balance of power
— playing off European nations that would tend to enhance
America's objectives. Trofimenko credits men such as Washington,
Jeffereson, Hamilton and Jackson with understanding the place of
war as a "continuation of politics" 50 years prior to Clausewitz.
Such was the wisdom of the early Americans. However, up to the
end of World War II, with the exception of Mahan, the U.S. has
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produced no great theorists and furthermore has produced no
Clausewitz ' s or many who rank with the leading European theorists
of war. Americans, according to Trofimenko, to this day do not
even possess a clear-cut distinction between military doctrine and
strategy whereas the Soviet Union has a firm grasp of the
differences.
While the national security policy of America was sufficient
for its time, policy took a drastic shift when America used atomic
weapons against Japan. The decision to drop the bomb, according
to the author, was not so much to end the war — the Soviets had
already beaten Hitler and were concentrating well enough on Japan -
- but to demonstrate American military might to the Soviet Union
and to a lesser extent China. This single event ushered in an era
of American desire for world hegemony and the policies of
Containment (1949-53) , Massive Retaliation (1953-60) , and Flexible
Response (1961-69). These policies were aimed at destroying the
Soviet socialist ideology while promoting American beliefs onto the
rest of the world. Trofimenko fails in his account to mention the
role played by the Berlin Blockade in 1948 and 1949 plus the
construction of the Berlin Wall and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
on the shaping of U.S. policy. Rather, it appears to the world's
benefit that the Soviets were able to "contain" the U.S.
The most notable failures of the American national security
policy manifested themselves in the outcome of the Korean and
Vietnam conflicts. By writing about and subsequently criticizing
American policy, Trofimenko may be attempting to critique Soviet
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thinking along the same lines. Pointing at faults in American
policy formation and in particular the U.S. propaganda machine of
building a ten-foot tall giant in the form of the Soviet Union
which added much fuel to the arms race could be the author's own
way of voicing his opinion of the Soviet policy-making process.
Statements such as "In any U.S. Congress, no more than fifteen
people can lay claim to any real competence in matters concerning
the world military balance and weapons system" (p. 132) seem
especially aimed at a Politburo during a time in which a major
debate was taking place concerning their own military doctrine and
strategy. Further criticisms of U.S. "think tanks" could reflect
a displeasure with the output of Soviet counterpart organizations.
Trofimenko also predicts that the U.S. is on the road to economic
ruin because of its reckless ways concerning arms buildups.
My favorite section of tha book and one I would highly
recommend to anyone who would be going to the Soviet Union or be
dealing with the Soviets in any type of negotiations would be the
short 17 page section entitled "Falsifying the "Enemy's Intentions
and Image: The American Way of Justifying the Arms Race." The
excuses used by the Reagan administration and misinformation
techniques used against the American military and government
leaders creates fertile ground for fear of the peace-loving Soviets
to grow forth. The book addresses the U.S. Navy as almost an
afterthought and describes its missions and composition in no where
near the depth applied in the rest of the book. It seems as though
the authors intent was to voice approval of Admiral Gorshkov's
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thoughts concerning the use of a navy.
I enjoyed the book very much. Trofimenko writes well and adds
a bit of sarcastic spice in a way that he demonstrates an American
way of thinking. The book is heavy at times on political rhetoric
but overall would be a valuable aid to anyone who needs to view
American doctrine from a Soviet perspective and also be aware of
arguments to American policy-making and outcome.
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